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Virtually everyone in today’s society is the recipient of some kind of
government benefit, whether in the form of government employment or
contracts, licenses or permits, or direct monetary or in-kind benefits.1
Notwithstanding the prevalence and importance of government benefits,
the Supreme Court has apparently taken the position that, when it comes
to the administration of government benefits, the availability of judicial
review by an Article III judge is contingent on legislative discretion. If
Congress chooses to preclude or limit this fundamental rule of law
safeguard, the Court has given every indication that it is willing to go
along.
The constitutionality of legislative preclusion of judicial review has
received considerable attention from constitutional and administrative
law scholars.2 In fact, it is the subject of one of the longest running and
most contentious debates in the federal courts scholarship.3 Academic
commentary on the issue varies widely, ranging from the position that
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1
We use the term “government benefits” to describe a broad spectrum of
benefits, including welfare and social security, public employment and
government contracts, and occupational licenses or building permits. Their
common feature is that they are benefits (including in principle relief from costs
or burdens) that private persons receive from the government. We have chosen
the term government benefits carefully to avoid the confusing doctrinal
connotations of the Article III concept of “public rights.” See infra notes __ and
accompanying text (discussing public rights). Nonetheless, as we use the
concept of government benefits, these interests would typically be regarded as
public rights.
2
See infra notes ___ & accompanying text.
3
See infra notes __ & accompanying text.
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Congress can freely preclude Article III review to the position that
Congress must provide for such review, with other scholars taking
intermediate positions that allow Congress to preclude judicial review of
some issues, but not others.
We join this debate by proposing a new approach: a standards-based
theory of judicial review. The standards-based approach supports a
much broader right to judicial review that would encompass most
administrative decisions, including decisions concerning government
benefits. We are not the first scholars to argue that the Constitution
requires Article III review of government benefit decisions (or other
agency action), but the standards-based approach offers a novel and, we
believe, more coherent and workable approach to these fundamental
constitutional issues.
Our standards-based theory is based on two fundamental principles.
First, whenever government officials make decisions involving the
application of legal standards, the rule of law – and hence the rule of law
safeguards of due process and judicial review – attach. Second, with the
exception of those cases in which the Constitution itself contemplates
standardless official discretion, legislative delegations of authority to
government actors must contain legal standards that guide and control
discretion. Because the availability of judicial review is tied to the
existence of standards and standards are in most instances
constitutionally required, the standards-based approach ensures that
Article III judicial review of administrative action is broadly available to
promote agency compliance with the rule of law.
This article is part of a larger project to rethink the application of
core rule of law safeguards to government benefits. In a previous
article,4 we criticized the Court’s current entitlement approach to
procedural due process in government benefit cases. That approach
leaves essential procedural safeguards, including notice and the right to
be heard, contingent on legislative discretion. We argued that the
current approach is the product of historical misunderstandings and
doctrinal missteps, and we advanced the standards-based approach to the
rule of law as a means of bringing coherence to due process doctrine and
securing due process protections for government benefits. Judicial
4

We have addressed the failures of the Court’s procedural due process
jurisprudence as it applies to government benefits in a related article. See Sidney
A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits and the Rule of Law:
Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.107
(2005).
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review of government benefits, like due process, is plagued by doctrinal
incoherence that ultimately permits Congress to curtail or dispense with
this essential rule of law safeguard.
Our aim is to restore judicial review to its rightful place in ensuring
the rule of law is followed in the allocation of government benefits. We
say “restore” because Marbury v. Madison,5 the seminal opinion
concerning the rule of law, indicates that Article III review of the
government benefit decisions of the Executive Branch is constitutionally
compelled.6 The Court’s seminal pronouncements concerning the rule of
law were articulated in the context of a government benefit – Marbury’s
claim to government employment.
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. Part I of the article examines
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison, which, as
mentioned, indicates that Article III review of the government benefit
decisions is constitutionally compelled. This aspect of Marbury has
been overlooked by other scholars and by the Supreme Court, which has
failed to account for it in its preclusion decisions.
Part II analyzes the “public rights” doctrine. Under current
interpretations of the public rights doctrine, Congress may freely
delegate the adjudication of government benefits to an administrative
agency (or other non-Article III forum) and foreclose judicial review of
those decisions by Article III judges.7 We reexamine the case law that
has given rise to this interpretation and reach a different conclusion.
While the doctrine justifies the first-instance adjudication of facts and
law by the Executive Branch, it does not, and cannot, justify legislative
preclusion of judicial review of such decisions.
Part III examines the Supreme Court’s decisions addressing
legislative preclusion of judicial review by Article III judges, which
5

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Recent scholarship has cast doubt on the historical significance of
Marbury, suggesting that the case had little influence throughout most of the
Nineteenth Century, and was “rediscovered” during the Lochner era in order to
justify judicial activism on behalf of economic rights. See, e.g, LARRY KRAMER,
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004). Whatever the accuracy of these historical accounts, Marbury’s rule of
law analysis remains foundational for current constitutional doctrine. More
fundamentally, the rule of law premises of Marbury have not been drawn into
question.
7
See infra notes __ & accompanying text.
6
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seem to suggest that preclusion in ordinary cases does not violate either
due process or Article III absent an independent constitutional violation.
The precise basis and contours of this doctrine, however, remain
muddled at best. More fundamentally, this result seems to us
irreconcilable with the rule of law. Thus, our examination of the case
law in these areas leads us to the conclusion that the standards-based
approach offers a superior foundation for analyzing the preclusion of
review.
Finally, part IV elaborates on our standards-based approach to
judicial review and explains how it impacts several issues that arise in
conjunction with legislative preclusion of review. We also compare our
approach to the large and contentious literature on legislative preclusion
of judicial review. We identify others who agree with us that Congress
cannot generally preclude judicial review and argue why our approach is
preferable to the approach taken by these other commentators. We end
Part IV by contrasting two government benefit systems: the Social
Security disability system, which is subject to meaningful review by
Article III courts, and the Veterans Benefit system, which is not. We
explain why experience with these two systems supports our contention
that Article III judicial review is an essential element in the protection of
rule of law.
I. MARBURY V. MADISON
We begin with the premise that the rule of law, as a matter of
constitutional principle and sound policy, should apply to government
benefit decisions. Decisions concerning government benefits are subject
to statutory standards in most cases, and under the rule of law those
standards bind government officials.
Because the constitutional
functions of due process and separation of powers can and should be
understood as providing essential safeguards to ensure compliance with
statutory standards,8 judicial review should apply to benefit decisions.
While the rule of law has various connotations and shades of
meaning, at bottom it reflects a core requirement of legal regularity
under which government actors derive their authority from and are
bound by the law.9 The seminal rule of law decision for American
constitutional jurisprudence, Marbury v. Madison, articulated and
applied fundamental rule of law principles in the context of a
8

See infra notes ___ & accompanying text.
See generally Richard Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997).
9
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government benefit: William Marbury’s claim to a commission as a
federal Justice of the Peace, which Secretary of State James Madison
refused to deliver after taking office.10 It follows that the differences
between government benefits and private rights do not justify their
exclusion from essential rule of law safeguards.
The Court held that while Marbury was entitled to a writ of
mandamus to remedy Madison’s wrongful refusal to deliver his
commission,11 Congress could not constitutionally confer original
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue the writ.12 The latter
proposition was the occasion for Marshall’s famous assertion of judicial
authority to declare legislative acts unconstitutional, but Marshall also
relied on rule of law principles to conclude that Marbury was entitled to
a writ of mandamus, which is the part of the opinion that establishes the
basic rule of law framework for administrative action.
Chief Justice Marshall supported his conclusion that Marbury was
entitled to a remedy for Madison’s failure to deliver his commission
with a negative proof premised on core rule of law principles.13 The first
10

The plaintiff, William Marbury, had been appointed under Midnight
Judge’s Act of 1801, a last-ditch effort by the Federalists (who had lost the last
election) to ensconce themselves in power by creating and filling new judicial
and executive offices. Marbury’s commission had been signed and sealed, but
John Marshall himself, who at the time was serving as Secretary of State,
neglected to ensure its delivery before leaving office. His successor as Secretary
of State, James Madison, refused to deliver it. For extended discussions of
Marby in historical context, see James O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV.
219 (1992); William Van Allstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
1969 DUKE L. J. 1
11
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163-73. As a threshold matter, the Chief Justice
initially concluded that Marbury’s right to the commission had vested when
signed and sealed, even though it had not been delivered. Id. at 155-62.
Although this conclusion may have been incorrect as a matter of then prevailing
law (and perhaps tainted by a conflict of interest, insofar as it was Marshall
himself who had failed to deliver the commission), these questions do not
undermine the rule of law reasoning that followed.
12
Id. at 173-80. As we develop later in the article, we believe this
conclusion was based on a misreading of Article III’s provisions allocating
original and appellate jurisdiction. See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
Our disagreement with Chief Justice Marshall on this point does not affect the
force of the basic rule of law principles he articulated.
13
Marshall’s decision to strike down the statute conferring original
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus as inconsistent
with Article III was likewise premised on rule of law principles. This conclusion
was based on the premise that Article III’s list of cases within the original
-5-
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proposition of this proof was that under the rule of law, there is a legal
remedy for the wrongful denial of a right.14 As Marshall put it, “[t]he
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury.”15 The second proposition is that the Constitution established a
rule of law state, expressed in Marshall’s famous pronouncement that
ours is a government of laws, not men.16 Marshall then reasoned to a
contradiction: “It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”17
This contradiction proved the opposite: that the laws must provide a
remedy for the wrongful denial of the commission. Marshall took it as a
given that the remedy to be provided would be a judicial one,
presumably because it is “profoundly the province of the judiciary to say
what the law is.”18
In making these pronouncements, Chief Justice Marshall was not
troubled in the least by the fact that the right at issue – Marbury’s
commission – was a governmentally created interest.19 Indeed, at

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is an exclusive one. See id. at 174-75. While
we disagree with this premise, see infra notes ___ and accompanying text, that
does not refute the rule of law reasoning on which judicial review is based For
Chief Justice Marshall, the adoption of a written constitution in which the
powers of government are limited necessarily implied that the constitution was
fundamental or superior law. See id. at 176-77. As such, when courts were
called upon to resolve cases and controversies, their duty was to apply the
superior law – i.e., the Constitution. See id. at 177-80.
14
Id. at 163. Marshall supported this premise by reference to Blackstone’s
statement that “‘where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit
or action at law whenever that right is invaded.’” Id. (quoting Blackstone’s
Commentaries, Volume 3, at 23).
15
Id.
16
Id. (quoted supra text at note ___).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 177. Although Marshall made this latter point in connection with
his discussion of judicial review of legislation, see infra notes ___ and
accompanying text, it would seem to be equally applicable to judicial review of
executive action. Under the United States constitutional system, the judiciary
bears the final responsibility for determining the legality of governmental action,
and for this reason we regard judicial review as an essential rule of law
safeguard. See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. In other constitutional
systems, alternative mechanisms for ensuring the legality of government action
might be fully consistent with the rule of law.
19
He simply assumed that “if [Marbury] has been appointed, the law
continues him in office for five years, and he is entitled to the possession of
those evidences of office, which, being completed, became his property.” 5 U.S.
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various points in the opinion Marshall cited other examples involving
government benefits, including veterans’ pensions20 and patents for
public land,21 as obvious cases in which the rule of law required a
remedy for wrongful government action.
Nor did it trouble Marshall that the right was being asserted against
the government, insofar as he rejected any exception from a writ of
mandamus based on Madison’s high office.22 More directly, in an oftenoverlooked passage, Marshall rejected any suggestion that sovereign
immunity would prevent legal remedies against government officials
who act in violation of their legal duties.23
Likewise, we see no reason why decisions about government
benefits should be any less protected by the rule of law than
governmental decisions affecting private property. The violation of the
rule of law is no less when the government fails to follow statutory
standards in the determination of government benefits than when it
commits the same sin in decisions that adversely affect private property.
While there are differences between private property and government
(1 Cranch) at 155; see also id. at 162 (“To withhold his commission, therefore, is
an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal
right.”). While Marshall spoke of the “evidences” of office as the property in
question, this was merely a convenient fiction. It is clear from his treatment of
the issue in other contexts that the underlying right to serve in the office was at
issue. See id. at 173 (concluding that there is no alternative legal remedy so as to
render mandamus inappropriate because “[t]he value of a public office not to be
sold, is incapable of being ascertained; and the applicant has a right to the office
itself, or nothing.”).
20
See id at 164:
By the act concerning invalids, passed in June 1794, the secretary at war is
directed to place on the pension list all persons whose names are contained in a
report previously made by him to congress. If he should refuse to do so, would
the veteran be without a remedy? Is it to be contended that where the law in
precise terms directs the performance of an act in which an individual is
interested, the law is incapable of securing obedience to its mandate?
21
See id. at 171 (citing the failure “to record a commission, or a patent for
land” as examples of cases in which “it is not perceived on what ground the
courts of the country are further excused from the duty of giving judgment, that
right to be done an injured individual, than if the same services were to be
performed by a person not the head of a department.”) While land may be
viewed as traditional private property, a patent for land is a government benefit
in the sense that the government creates an individual interest in formerly public
lands.
22
Id. at 169-73.
23
Id. at 165.
-7-
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benefits that might justify a greater level of substantive protection for the
creation and retention of private wealth,24 the injury to rule of law
principles is the same regardless of the character of the underlying
interest.
In sum, the rule of law principles articulated in Marbury, including
the right of judicial review of executive action for compliance with the
law, were articulated in the context of a government benefit case and
must be regarded as fully applicable to government benefits. Marbury
does not recognize either the governmental creation of these interests or
their assertion as rights against the government as having any
implications for the rule of law.25 This makes sense because the
government’s failure to comply with statutory standards is a violation of
the rule of law whether it involves government benefits or private
property.
Despite Marbury, however, the Supreme Court and many
commentators have generally assumed that judicial review of the factual
and legal basis for ordinary government benefit claims may be statutorily
precluded. One basis for this assumption is the public rights doctrine,
which we consider in the following section.
II.

THE PUBLIC RIGHTS DOCTRINE

The “public rights” doctrine figures prominently in cases analyzing
whether administrative adjudication infringes on judicial power in
violation of Article III. Under modern case law, as we will develop,26
public rights encompass all forms of government benefits. Although the
cases discussing the doctrine involve only the propriety of first instance
administrative adjudication, the Court’s broad pronouncements imply
that Congress may assign adjudication of public rights to administrative
agencies with no judicial review. As we demonstrate in this part of the
Article, however, the public rights doctrine, properly understood, is
simply irrelevant to the question of judicial review.
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

24

For an elaboration of this point, see Shapiro & Levy, supra note ___, at
145-46.
25
As we take up in Part II, the Court has sometimes premised its “public
rights” doctrine on the government’s sovereign immunity, which is understood to
authorize Congress to preclude Article III judicial review of government benefit
decisions.
26
See infra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing Granfinanciera).
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The public rights doctrine originated in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land and Improvement Company,27 a mid-nineteenth century decision,
in which the Court stated broadly that “there are matters, involving
public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial
power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial
determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.”28
With the rise of the administrative state, Murray’s Lessee took on a
talismanic importance for the reconciliation of administrative
adjudication with Article III. The Court has relied on the distinction
between public and private rights in a series of decisions deciding the
constitutionality of administrative adjudication.29 These cases have
raised more questions about the public rights doctrine than they have
resolved, leaving the doctrine in an incoherent muddle.
1. CROWELL V. BENSON
One of the first landmark cases for modern administrative
adjudication, Crowell v. Benson,30 upheld the first-instance adjudication
of a workers compensation claim by an administrative tribunal. The
Court began its analysis with the distinction between public and private
rights, stating in dicta that the “‘mode of determining [public rights] is
completely within congressional control.’”31 The public rights doctrine
27

59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
Id. at 284.
29
The public rights doctrine has also been used to uphold the creation of
“legislative” or “Article I” courts whose judges do not meet Article III
requirements, such as the Tax Court and the Court of Claims. See generally
Fallon, supra note __, at 921-23. For purposes of our analysis, these tribunals
are no different than administrative agencies performing judicial functions.
30
285 U.S. 22 (1932). There were a number of cases invoking the doctrine
between Murray’s Lessee and Crowell, see id. at 50-51 (citing cases), but
Crowell is usually regarded by both courts and commentators as laying the
foundations for modern administrative adjudication.
31
Id. at 50 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
Bakelite upheld the Court of Claims as a legislative court, identifying such
claims as falling in the class of cases “arising between the government and
others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are
susceptible of it.” Id. Bakelite expressly relied on sovereign immunity, noting
that
Conspicuous among such matters are claims against the United States.
These may arise in many ways and may be for money, lands, or other
things. They all admit of legislative or executive determination, and yet
from their nature are susceptible of determination by courts; but no
28
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was inapplicable in Crowell, however, because the case arose between
private parties and therefore concerned a matter of private rights.32
The Court nonetheless upheld adjudication of the claim by an
administrative tribunal, approving its role as an “adjunct” to the courts.33
Critically, and in contrast to the Court’s assumptions regarding public
rights, under the adjunct theory, the use of agencies to determine private
rights was permissible only if there was judicial review, which had to be
de novo as to questions of law and as to questions constitutional or
jurisdictional fact.34 While the requirements of de novo review have
faded,35 the basic dichotomy articulated by Crowell continues to
influence the analysis of administrative adjudication: administrative
adjudication of public rights is apparently permissible without any
judicial review, while administrative adjudication of private rights is
permissible only if the Courts retain sufficient power of review.
2. NORTHERN PIPELINE CO.
The uncertainty of the rationale for public rights was explicitly noted
in the next major decision invoking the doctrine, Northern Pipeline Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,36 which invalidated provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code conferring on bankruptcy courts broad jurisdiction
over common law claims involving a debtor’s estate. In his plurality
opinion in Northern Pipeline, Justice Brennan distinguished bankruptcy
court adjudication of common law claims from other accepted categories
of legislative courts, including those adjudicating of public rights.

court can have cognizance of them except as Congress makes specific
provision therefor. Nor do claimants have any right to sue on them
unless Congress consents; and Congress may attach to its consent such
conditions as it deems proper, even to requiring that the suits be
brought in a legislative court specially created to consider them.
Id. at 452. Congress subsequently proclaimed that the Court of Claims (as well
as the Patent Court) was an Article III court and the reasoning of Bakelite has
been drawn into question by the Supreme Court. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 531, 547-49 (1962).
32
285 U.S. at 51.
33
Id. at 51-52. The Court analogized the agency to the use of special
masters to find facts.
34
See 285 U.S. at 51-61. The Court then construed the statute to permit
such review (so as to avoid constitutional difficulty) and approved the trial
court’s de novo determination that the agency lacked jurisdiction.
35
See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R.
VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.2.2. (3d ed. 1999).
36
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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After quoting from Murray’s Lessee, the plurality opinion noted two
rationales for the public rights doctrine:
This doctrine may be explained in part by reference to the
traditional principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes
that the Government may attach conditions to its consent to be
sued. . . . But the public-rights doctrine also draws upon the
principle of separation of powers, and a historical understanding
that certain prerogatives are reserved to the political Branches of
Government.37
Justice Brennan found it unnecessary to define public rights with great
precision because “at a minimum” they only arise when the government
is a party, which was not the case in the context of the bankruptcy
adjudication in question.38 Having determined that the bankruptcy
courts did not fall within the public rights or any other legislative court
exception to Article III, Justice Brennan ultimately concluded that the
bankruptcy courts’ broad jurisdiction was unconstitutional because it
transferred the “essential attributes of judicial power” to non-Article III
courts.39
3. THOMAS V. UNION CARBIDE
In Thomas v. Union Carbide,40 the Court moved away from a
categorical distinction between public and private rights. Thomas is
significant because it arose between private parties, yet Justice
O’Connor, writing for the majority, noted that the right at issue “bears
many of the characteristics of a public right” because it involved “an
agency administering a complex regulatory scheme.”41 The right was a
statutory right of an initial pesticide registrant to be compensated by a
follow-on registrant, who was permitted to rely on data submitted by the
initial registrant after paying the initial registrant for use of the data. If
the initial and follow-on registrants could not agree on reasonable
compensation, the statute provided for mandatory and binding
37

Id. at 67 (citations to Murray’s Lessee and Ex parte Bakelite omitted).
Id. at 69. Justice Brennan’s discussion also indicated that public rights
arise only with respect to matters that “could have been determined exclusively”
by the legislative or executive branch. Id. at 68. This view of the doctrine is
quite narrow, and we would agree with it insofar as foreclosure of judicial
review is concerned. See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
39
See id. at 84-85.
40
473 U.S. 568, 585-86 (1985).
41
473 U.S. at 589.
38
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arbitration, with very limited judicial review. Although the arbitration
mechanism at issue in Thomas permitted review only for fraud,
misconduct, or misrepresentation and for constitutional errors, the Court
upheld this provision because it preserved the “‘appropriate exercise of
the judicial function.’” 42
In light of the relationship between the statutory scheme and the
private rights, Justice O’Connor concluded that “Congress, acting for a
valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under
Article I, may create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely
integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate
for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III
judiciary.”43 Based on this language, it is unclear whether the Court
concluded that the right was a public right or merely that, although it
was a private right, its public rights features justified administrative
adjudication. Critically, however, by reference to the public rights
doctrine, the Court upheld determination of claims by a non-Article III
tribunal with only very limited judicial review.44
4. CFTC V. SCHOR
The next case, CFTC v. Schor,45 is more significant than Thomas
because it purported to adopt a new and comprehensive test for
administrative adjudication. Schor upheld the adjudication by the CFTC
of state common law contract claims asserted by the defendant brokerage
firm in response to the plaintiff customer’s private claims alleging
violations of the federal commodities laws.46
In analyzing the Article III issue, the opinion articulated and applied
a three factor test which considers:
the extent to which the “essential attributes of judicial power”
are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to
which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III
courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated,
and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the
42

id. at 592.
Id. at 593-94.
44
As we will explain further in later portions of this article, review for fraud,
misconduct, misrepresentation, and constitutional error are insufficient to
preserve the rule of law. See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
45
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
46
478 U.S. at 851.
43
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requirements of Article III.47
Within the context of this test, the majority expressly rejected the
Marathon plurality’s categorical treatment of the public rights doctrine,
which became only a factor to be considered within the context of the
“origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated” component of the
test. 48
Under the first component of Schor test, the scope of judicial review
is a critical factor in determining whether the essential attributes of
judicial power have been reserved to Article III courts. Thus, unlike the
cases before it, Schor implies that Article III may require judicial review
of administrative adjudications involving public rights. At the same
time, however, because the origins and importance of the right asserted
is also a factor, the Schor test apparently continues to accord public
rights second class status and implies that a narrow scope of review,
such as that in Thomas, would be constitutional when public rights are
involved.
Schor’s treatment of the public rights doctrine focused on the
executive power rationale for administrative adjudication. Both it and
Thomas observed that “‘the public rights doctrine reflects simply a
pragmatic understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial
method of resolving matters that ‘could be conclusively determined by
the Executive and Legislative Branches’, the danger of encroaching on
the judicial powers’ is less ….’”49 Conversely, neither Schor nor Thomas
mentioned sovereign immunity or congressional consent as a factor.50
47

Id. The essential attributes factors was itself to be evaluated in light of
various considerations, including the breadth of jurisdiction vested in the nonArticle III tribunal, the scope of judicial review, and the ancillary judicial powers
vested in the non-Article III tribunal. See id. at 851-53.
48
See id. at 853. (“[T]his Court has rejected any attempt to make
determinative for Article III purposes the distinction between public and private
rights . . .”) (citing Thomas).
49
Id. at 853-54 (quoting Thomas at 589 (quoting Marathon at 68)).
50
Under the Schor test, the scope of judicial review of public rights is only a
factor in assessing the constitutionality of administrative adjudication of public
rights. On the other hand, judicial scrutiny of administrative adjudication of
public rights would apparently be less “searching” than what appears already to
be a very loose test for private rights. See id. at 854. This point was explicit in
Thomas, where Justice O’Connor observed that a majority of the Court did not
“endorse the implication of the private right/public right dichotomy that Article
III has no force simply because a dispute is between the Government and an
individual.” 473 U.S. at 586 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68 n.20 and
- 13 -
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5. GRANFINANCIERA
Schor seemed to bring some order to this area by crafting a
comprehensive, if open-ended, test. This clarity, however, was shortlived because of the Court’s decision in Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg,51 decided only three years later. Granfinanciera was a
Seventh Amendment case challenging the constitutionality of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction to adjudicate preferential transfer claims
without a jury. The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Brennan (who
also authored the Marathon plurality), expressly incorporated the Article
III public rights doctrine into its Seventh Amendment analysis.52
Without addressing the availability of judicial review, Justice
Brennan returned to the more categorical assumption that public rights
could be freely assigned to administrative adjudication without violating
the Seventh Amendment or, by extension, Article III.53 The Court then
further confused existing doctrine by adopting an expanded definition of
public rights, which would include “‘a seemingly ‘private’ right that is
so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter
appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the
Article III judiciary.’”54
70 n.23).
51
492 U.S. 33 (1989).
52
Id. at 53:
Indeed, our decisions point to the conclusion that, if a statutory cause of
action is legal in nature, the question of whether the Seventh
Amendment permits Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal
that does not employ juries as factfinders requires the same answer as
whether Article III allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause
of action to a non-Article III tribunal. For if a statutory cause of action
. . . is not a ‘public right’ for Article III purposes, then Congress may
not assign its adjudication to a specialized non-Article III court . . . .
And if the action must be tried under the auspices of an Article III
court, then the Seventh Amendment affords the parties a right to a jury
trial whenever the cause of action is legal in nature.
53
See id. at 51 (“Congress may devise novel causes of action involving
public rights free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment if it assigns their
adjudication to tribunals without statutory authority to employ juries as
factfinders.”).
54
Id. at 54 (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 593-94). The Court also cited
Thomas as rejecting the view that “‘a matter of public rights must at a minimum
arise ‘between the government and others.’’” Id. (quoting Justice Brennan’s
Marathon plurality, 458 U.S. at 69, which in turn quoted Ex parte Bakelite, 279
U.S. at 451). Even applying the broader definition of public rights, the majority

STANDARDS-BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW
15

Although Granfinanciera did not attempt to explain the public rights
doctrine, it seemed to focus on administrative adjudication as execution
of the law.55 Since the Court anticipated that some rights arising
between private parties could be the public rights, it is inconsistent with
the sovereign immunity rationale for public rights on which the Court
had previously relied. In any case, the analysis also returns to the
categorical approach to the public rights doctrine, which – taken together
with the new, broader definition of public rights – threatens to
undermine judicial review as a rule of law safeguard for some private
rights. Thus, for example, Professors Aman and Mayton caution that
under Granfinanciera, “almost any private, common-law sort of action
may be converted by Congress to a matter of public right and thereby
moved outside the zone of Article III courts.”56
The majority’s reasoning provoked a concurring opinion from
Justice Scalia, who flatly rejected the expanded definition of public
rights and emphasized the sovereign immunity rationale from Murray’s
Lessee.57 After an extensive discussion of Murray’s Lessee, Justice
Scalia continued:
It is clear that what we meant by public rights were not rights
important to the public, or rights created by the public, but rights
of the public – that is, rights pertaining to claims brought by or
against the United States. For central to our reasoning was the
device of waiver of sovereign immunity, as a means of
converting a subject which, though its resolution involved a
“judicial act,” could not be brought before the courts, into the
stuff of an Article III “judicial controversy.” Waiver of
sovereign immunity can only be implicated, of course, in suits
where the government is a party.58
Justice Scalia disagreed not only with the expansion of public rights
concluded that a fraudulent conveyance action in bankruptcy was not a public
right and invalidated the adjudication of such claims without a jury.
55
See id. at 51-55.
56
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
122 (1st ed 1993).
57
See 492 U.S. at 65-71.
58
Id. at 68 (emphasis in original). As will be developed infra notes ___ and
accompanying text, we agree with Justice Scalia that public rights refer to rights
of the public, but not with his conclusion that this understanding implicates
sovereign immunity.
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doctrine to include some rights between private parties, but also with the
open-ended analysis of Schor, and he would apparently envision a very
strict limitation on non-Article III adjudication of private rights between
parties.59
B. DOCTRINAL INCOHERENCE
We think that few will disagree with our conclusion that the public
rights doctrine is a mess. Several critical questions remain unresolved.
First, the doctrine’s underlying rationale remains unclear. Second, it is
unclear whether the presence of a public right categorically removes the
case from Article III requirements, or whether it is simply a factor to be
considered. Finally, it is unclear the extent to which rights arising
between private parties may be characterized as public rights and why
this would be so. More fundamentally, however, to the extent that the
doctrine implies that Congress may preclude or sharply limit judicial
review of administrative decisions, it is inconsistent with Marbury and
the rule of law.
The cases identify two distinct rationales without clearly articulating
either. Traditional accounts of the doctrine emphasize sovereign
immunity and reason that because Congress need not grant any remedy
against the government, there can be not objection to the provision of an
administrative remedy without judicial review.60 Consider, for example,
the following hornbook explanation of Murray’s Lessee:
The Court [in Murray’s Lessee] explained that Article III does
not apply to public rights because of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Since the federal government may not be sued
without its consent, a litigant is entitled to sue in federal court
claiming rights created by an act of Congress only if that or
another law consents to such suit.61
The sovereign immunity rationale is not entirely satisfying for a
number of reasons. This sort of greater-includes-the-lesser-power
inclusion has been rejected in other contexts, such as procedural due
process, where the greater power to create an entitlement does not
59

See id. at 69-71.
See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW, ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD & RONALD M.
LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 636 (1998) (“The consensus
of the commentators is that Congress can deprive the federal courts of the power
to review some disputes (such as claims for Medicare benefits), but cannot deny
litigants a federal forum for the assertion of constitutional claims.”).
61
PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note ____ , at 75.
60
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include the lesser power to specify the procedures attached to its
termination.62 Even accepting its logic, the argument rests on the faulty
premise that sovereign immunity would bar any form of judicial remedy
against the government. This is simply wrong; under the doctrine of Ex
Parte Young,63 sovereign immunity does not prevent suits against
government officials for injunctive relief to prevent illegal conduct.64
Indeed, the sovereign immunity rationale is directly contrary to
Marbury’s treatment of sovereign immunity.65
The executive power rationale for the public rights doctrine, which
was emphasized in Northern Pipeline, appears to be on the ascendancy.66
Nonetheless, this rationale remains entirely unexplained. The Court has
stated that administrative determinations resembling judicial decisions
have elements of executive power when public rights are involved,67 but
never explained why. Instead, this explanation is entirely circular:
administrative adjudication of public rights is permissible because such
determinations are executive in character, and they are executive in
character because they are public rights. Characterizing public rights
decisions as executive, moreover, does not explain why judicial review
can be foreclosed or sharply limited. Marbury posits precisely the
opposite – that there must be a remedy for unlawful executive action.
The underlying confusion about the rationale for the public rights
doctrine breeds confusion about its application. This uncertainty affects
the very definition of public rights. Granfinanciera’s extension of
public rights to some congressionally created rights between private
parties removed the bright line certainty of the traditional understanding
of Crowell v. Benson and Northern Pipeline that public rights arise only
when the government is a party. Interpreted broadly, this definition
could convert many seemingly private rights – including the workers
62

See Shapiro & Levy, supra note ___, at 118 (discussing the Court’s
rejection of this argument). The Court’s treatment of government benefits in the
due process context is closely connected to the question of judicial review,
because procedural due process and judicial review are the two principal rule of
law safeguards built into the constitutional order.
63
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
64
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
65
See supra note ___ and accompanying text (discussing often overlooked
passage in Marbury that rejects sovereign immunity as a bar to a remedy).
66
Insofar as Granfinanciera’s definition of public rights is inconsistent with
the sovereign immunity rationale, see infra notes ___ and accompanying text, the
doctrine must rest on the executive power rationale.
67
See, e.g., Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 910-11 (1991); Granfinanciera,
492 U.S. at 65-66; Crowell v. Benson 285 U.S. at 50-51.
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compensation claim in Crowell – into public ones. The Court has
offered little guidance concerning how to determine whether a
congressionally created right between private parties is a public right.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that the Court has definitively
adopted this expanded concept of public rights.
Insofar as
Granfinanciera ultimately held that the action in question was a private
right68 and Thomas, in which this expanded concept originated, was
ambiguous,69 the Court has never clearly held that a right arising
between private parties was a public right. In addition, Granfinanciera
is a Seventh Amendment case and might not be wholly applicable in the
Article III context.
Another uncertainty surrounding the public rights doctrine is the
doctrinal significance of characterizing the right at issue as a public
right. Starting with the broad language in Murray’s and reinforced by
the sovereign immunity rationale, the traditional statement of the
doctrine long assumed that public rights adjudications could be vested
exclusively in administrative agencies with no judicial involvement.
This complete exclusion approach is reflected in Crowell, Marathon,
and Granfinanciera. Thomas and Schor, on the other hand, treat the
type of right involved as merely a factor in a larger analysis. As noted
previously, the application of this approach might require some judicial
review of public right determinations, but would apparently permit that
review to be very sharply limited.
Although the public rights doctrine is rife with doctrinal confusion,
our more fundamental objection to the doctrine, as currently understood,
is that it is inconsistent with the rule of law. Moreover, as we will
develop in the following section, the current doctrine rests on a
fundamental misunderstanding of Murray’s Lessee.
Once this
misunderstanding is corrected, a coherent and more constrained public
rights doctrine comes into view. This new understanding explains why
first instance administrative adjudication of public rights is
constitutionally permissible and it clarifies that the public rights
doctrine, properly understood, has no bearing on the question of judicial
review.
68

See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
The Court actually stated that although the right arose between private
parties, it bore many of the characteristics of a public right because it was a
congressionally created right integral to a comprehensive regulatory regime. See
supra notes ___ and accompanying text. This language actually implies that the
right was a private right, and Granfinanciera’s misrepresent Thomas insofar as
the Court suggested that the language in Thomas defined public rights.
69
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C. RETHINKING PUBLIC RIGHTS
This section will offer an alternative interpretation of the public
rights doctrine of Murray’s Lessee based on the recognition that the
“public right” in that case was not a right asserted against the
government, but rather a right asserted by the government on behalf of
the public. This interpretation leads to two critical conclusions. First,
the sovereign immunity rationale for the public rights doctrine simply
makes no sense as a justification for the result in the case. Second, the
government’s role is relevant not because it could invoke sovereign
immunity, but rather because the assertion of public rights by
government actors is an executive act even when it resembles
adjudication. Because it is an executive act, administrative adjudication
is consistent with Article III. This rationale, however, says nothing
about whether judicial review of such action may be foreclosed.
1. THE REAL MURRAY’S LESSEE
Murray’s Lessee is a difficult case with complex facts, convoluted
arguments and arcane language. The Court, moreover, failed to explain
what it meant by the term, “public rights,” leaving readers to infer the
meaning from its reasoning. This may explain why courts and
commentators tend to repeat its broad language regarding public rights
without a careful examination of what the Court was really talking about
or the significance of this discussion in context. Unpacking the real
Murray’s Lessee,70 however, is essential to a true understanding of the
public rights doctrine.
The case arose as an “action of ejectment” involving a dispute
between private parties over title to land originally owned by a man
named Samuel Swartwout.71 Swartwout was a customs collector for the
United States who had failed to remit to the federal government over $1
million in customs payments that he collected.72 Congress had
70

Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Granfinanciera is a notable judicial
exception, but as we shall develop, Justice Scalia got Murray’s Lessee only half
right. For other academic treatments of Murray’s Lessee, see James E. Pfander,
Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United
States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 731-40 (2004); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights
and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s Lessee Through Crowell to
Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765 (1986).
71
59 U.S. (18 How.) at 274.
72
See id.
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authorized the Treasury Department to audit the accounts of tax
collectors, subject to judicial review, and to recover any deficiencies by
issuing a distress warrant against their property. Pursuant to this
authority, the government determined a deficiency, seized land owned by
Swartwout, and sold it in a distress sale to the persons who became the
defendants in Murray’s Lessee.73 Swartwout, who had disappeared, did
not seek judicial review of the audit or contest the seizure and sale of his
property.
Swartwout had also defaulted on debts to private creditors, and one
of them was the plaintiff in the case. Swartwout’s creditor sought to
attach the land purchased by the defendants at the distress sale to satisfy
the debt. He made two arguments against the validity of the
government’s seizure and sale of the Swartwout’s land. First, he argued
that distress warrant procedure violated due process, but the Court
rejected this argument in light of a history of summary execution against
the property of defaulting tax collectors.74 Second, he argued that the
distress warrant procedure violated separation of powers. The origin of
the public rights doctrine is found in the Court’s resolution of the
plaintiff’s second argument.
The Court’s analysis of the separation of powers issues began with
the recognition that there was an inevitable overlap between executive
and judicial actions, insofar as many executive actions involve the
determination of facts and the application to them of legal rules.75 The
Court expressed “little doubt” that the type of audit that the Treasury
Department undertook could be the subject of judicial power,76 but
concluded that it could also be resolved by the executive branch.77 The
Court justified this conclusion on the basis of historical understandings,
referencing the practices of both federal and state governments in the
United States as well as those of the British government.78
The plaintiff did not dispute these premises, but rather argued that,
73

See id. at 274-75
See id. at 275-80. In light of longstanding British, state, and federal
practices, the Court concluded, while “‘due process of law’ generally implies and
includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial
according to some settled course of judicial proceedings,” there are exceptions to
this rule under which “process, in its nature final, issues against the body, lands,
and goods of certain public debtors without any such trial.” Id. at 280.
75
See id. at 280-81.
76
Id. at 281.
77
See id. at 281-82.
78
See id. at 281-82.
74
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having made the matter subject to judicial review, Congress could not
authorize the Executive branch to make the initial audit and
determination of default. In other words, the plaintiff’s argument was
that Congress could not divide responsibility for the matter between the
executive and judicial branches, but rather was required to vest the
determination either entirely in the courts or entirely in the executive
branch.79 The Court introduced the “public rights” concept in response
to this argument to explain why the matter could be resolved by a
procedure that employed both the executive and judicial branches.
The Court disputed the premises of the plaintiff’s argument, which
wrongly assumed “that the entire subject matter is or is not, in every
mode of presentation, a judicial controversy essentially and in its own
nature, aside from the will of congress to permit it to be so; and it leaves
out of view the fact that the United States is a party.”80 It was at this
point in the analysis that the Court made its oft-repeated pronouncement
that “there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented
in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and
which are susceptible to judicial determination, but which Congress may
or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United
States, as it may deem proper.”81
Thus, the function of the public rights doctrine in Murray’s Lessee
was to explain why the application of law to fact in the first instance
could be assigned to an executive agency in the first instance and yet be
subject to judicial review. It is based on the recognition that executive
and judicial functions often overlap because both may involve the
determination of facts and the application to them of the law. In light of
this overlap, Congress has broad discretion concerning the allocation of
authority between the two branches. As we shall see, however, this
discretion does not include the foreclosure of judicial review.
2. MURRAY’S LESSEE AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The assumption that Congress may foreclose review derives from
the conventional, sovereign immunity-based understanding of the public
rights doctrine. This conventional understanding emerges naturally from
some of the Court’s language in Murray’s Lessee, but it is wrong. There
is language in the opinion emphasizing that the government is a party to
the dispute. It is also true that the Court assumed that sovereign
79

Id. at 282.
Id. at 283.
81
Id. at 284.
80
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immunity would preclude a remedy against the government in the
absence of congressional consent. Nonetheless, even in Murray;s
Lessee itself, the sovereign immunity rationale for the public rights
doctrine makes no sense.
To begin with, sovereign immunity simply was not implicated on the
facts in Murray’s Lessee. The case involved an action between two
private parties. The defendant’s claim derived from the government,
but resolving the dispute would not require any remedy against the
government.82 Moreover, Congress did create a judicial remedy for a
wrongful accounting by the Treasury, although Swartwout had failed to
pursue it.83 Maybe Congress did not have to create the remedy, but that
issue was simply not before the Court and any pronouncements about it
are clearly dicta.
On the facts of Murray’s Lessee, moreover, the argument that
sovereign immunity would have given Congress the power to preclude
judicial review of the accounting, seizure, and sale proves either too
much or too little. The property seized by the government pursuant to
the warrant – land owned by Swartwout – was traditional private
property.84 Thus, if sovereign immunity converts the administrative
attachment and sale of private property into a public right as to which no
judicial remedy is required, the government can use summary procedures
to take whatever private property it might choose and leave the owner
without recourse. This would surely convert the Takings Clause into a
hollow shell.85 By similar logic the government could violate any
82

If the seizure and sale had been undertaken by a foreign government in its
own territory, the act of state doctrine would apply to protect the sovereign
power of the foreign government from review by United States courts. cite But
that doctrine does not apply to judicial review of actions by the federal
government.
83
See supra note ___ and accompanying text.
84
A different situation would be presented if the government had only
attached the actual tax monies Swartwout failed to remit or property that was
directly traceable to it, but the statute in question permitted the warrant to attach
to all of a tax collector’s land, see id. at 274, and there was no suggestion in the
case that Swartwout had purchased the land with tax monies.
85
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 315-316 & n. 9 (1987), the Court indicated that the Fifth
Amendment provided a self-executing constitutional remedy for takings
violations, and rejected the argument that the principle of sovereign immunity
altered that conclusion. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia took the opposite view in his
dissent in Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 613 (1988): "No one would suggest
that, if Congress had not passed the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1), the
courts would be able to order disbursements from the Treasury to pay for
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constitutional right with impunity simply by acting first and declining to
waive sovereign immunity. Of course, we doubt that the Court would
accept this logic, but if Murray’s Lessee is based on sovereign immunity,
there would not appear to be any basis for drawing a distinction between
government benefits and private property.86
One might confine the implications of the sovereign immunity
rationale in Murray’s Lessee by limiting it to the context of a defaulting
tax collector or similar claims, which present special circumstances that
might justify the use of summary administrative procedures. The
temptations of collecting large sums of money and the potential
consequences to the public fisc arguably create a special need for speedy
and effective remedies in the case of a default. Thus, a tax collector’s
particular responsibilities arguably justify imposing the acceptance of
summary procedures as a condition of employment. These features of
the case were emphasized in the earlier portions of the Court’s opinion
in Murray’s Lessee addressing the due process issue.87 Confined in this
manner, however, the public rights doctrine is quite narrow, and
certainly would not support its extended application in the modern
administrative state.
The assumption that because of sovereign immunity Congress can
preclude judicial review of government benefit claims was also contrary
to Supreme Court precedent as it stood at the time of Murray’s Lessee.88
In an often unnoticed passage in Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall
distinguished between sovereign immunity in personal injury actions, as
to which the common law presumed that the king could do no wrong,
and injury to property, for which the law “‘furnishes various methods of
detecting the errors and misconduct of those agents by whom the king
has been deceived and induced to do a temporary injustice.’”89 Thus,
Marbury assumes that sovereign immunity does not preclude remedies

property taken under lawful authority (and subsequently destroyed) without just
compensation." See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The
Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52
Vand. L. Rev. 57, 137-39 (1999) (discussing sovereign immunity constraints on
recovery for government takings). A detailed exposition of this fascinating issue
is beyond the scope of this Article. It should be evident, however, where we
would come out.
86
See supra notes __ & accompanying text.
87
See supra notes __ & accompanying text.
88
It is also contrary to more recent understandings of sovereign immunity.
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
89
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166 (citing Blackstone, Vol. III. p. 255).
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against government officials who violate the law.90
Even more directly relevant is United States v. Nourse,91 an 1835
decision involving the very statute at issue in Murray’s Lessee, in which
Chief Justice Marshall was emphatic that sovereign immunity did not
bar suits against government officials:
It would excite some surprise if, in a government of laws and
principle, furnished with a department whose appropriate duty it
is to decide questions of right, not only between individuals, but
between the government and individuals; a ministerial officer
might, at his discretion, issue this powerful process, and levy on
the person, lands, and chattels of the debtor, any sum he might
believe to be due, leaving to that debtor no remedy, no appeal to
the laws of his country, if he should believe the claim to be
unjust. But this anomaly does not exist; this imputation cannot
be cast upon the legislature of the United States.92
In short, whether sovereign immunity would have precluded review of
the audit of Swartwout’s accounts and subsequent sale of his property
was by no means clear at the time of Murray’s Lessee.
3. EXECUTIVE POWER IN MURRAY’S LESSEE
Ultimately, sovereign immunity does not work as an explanation for
the public rights doctrine in Murray’s Lessee because that reasoning is
based on a misreading of what the court meant by public rights. Public
rights are not public because they are asserted against the government.
Public rights are public because they belong to the public. Because the
enforcement of rights belonging to the public is an executive function,
public rights determinations that resemble adjudications can be assigned
90

Similarly, in his later discussion of the propriety of a writ of mandamus,
Marshall indicated that the same remedies were available against government
officials as against private parties. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170:
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under colour
of his office, by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be
pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in the
ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the
judgment of the law. How then can his office exempt him from this
particular mode of deciding on the legality of his conduct, if the case be
such a case as would, were any other individual the party complained
of, authorize the process?
91
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 8 (1935).
92
Id. at 28-29.
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to administrative agencies.93
This perspective thus provides a
foundation for the executive power rationale for public rights. It also
means, however, that the doctrine is relevant only to first instance
adjudication and has no bearing on the question of judicial review.94
The Court in Murray’s Lessee suggested the executive power
rationale for administrative adjudication at the outset of its separation of
powers analysis. The Court noted that while “the auditing of the
accounts of a receiver of public moneys may be, in an enlarged sense, a
judicial act, . . . [s]o are all of those administrative duties the
performance of which involves inquiry into the existence of facts and the
application to them of rules of law.”95 The Court then gave examples of
other executive actions which are judicial in this sense, including calling
forth the militia pursuant to statute and seeking extradition of prisoners
pursuant to treaty.96 This surprisingly modern explanation of the overlap
between executive and judicial power makes clear that the Court’s focus
is on the characterization of the actions in question, not sovereign
immunity.
Even more significant is a passage that comes immediately before
the Court’s famous pronouncement on public rights. In this passage the
Court elaborated on how a matter could be subject to both executive and
judicial cognizance by reviewing “some settled rules”:
Though, generally, both public and private wrongs are redressed
through judicial action, there are more summary extrajudicial
remedies for both. An instance of extra-judicial redress of a
93

See Craig A. Stern, What’s A Constitution Among Friends – Unbalancing
Article III, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1043, 1062 (1998) (“What makes a matter one of
public rights is . . . whether the right is one that falls to the executive to
determine as a matter of public administration, at least for the time being.”).
94
In Marbury, for example, the delivery (or nondelivery) of the commission
in question was an executive act, but it also involved the application of law to
fact in the sense that Madison made an initial determination of whether Marbury
was entitled to the commission. The propriety of allocating this initial decision
to the executive branch was not in doubt, but it did not follow that judicial
review was foreclosed. To the contrary, it was implicitly required by the rule of
law. In the same sense, a determination that a claimant is or is not entitled to a
particular government benefit may be one that may be assigned initially either to
the executive branch or the judiciary, but that does not answer the question
whether, if it assigned to the executive, judicial review may be foreclosed.
95
Id. at 280. This functional analysis of the overlap between executive and
judicial action has a surprisingly current ring to it.
96
Id.
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private wrong is, the recapture of goods by their lawful owner;
of a public wrong, by a private person, is the abatement of a
public nuisance; and the recovery of public dues by a summary
process of distress, issued by some public officer authorized by
law, is an instance of redress of a particular kind of public
wrong, by the act of the public through its authorized agents.97

We believe that the Court’s reference to “public wrongs” is an oftenoverlooked antecedent referent for the concept of “public rights.” After
all, a “public wrong” is simply the violation of a “public right” or a right
belonging to the public.98
Consider, for example, the Court’s use of a public nuisance to
illustrate a public wrong that may be redressed by the actions of a
private party. According to well-established law, a “public nuisance is
based on an infringement of the rights of the community, must affect an
interest in common to the general public, and unlike a private nuisance,
does not necessarily involve ownership or use of land by either party.”99
In other words, a public nuisance violates rights that belong to the
public. Governmental enforcement of such rights is properly assigned to
the executive branch.
Once it is recognized that the concept of public rights in Murray’s
Lessee referred to the government’s pursuit of extrajudicial remedies to
protect the public interest, the Court’s discussion of the overlap between
executive and judicial power comes into sharper focus. When Congress
enacts a statute, the public interest served by that statute may be
enforced by means of the Article III adjudication if Congress provides
for a private right of action (private enforcement) or for a government
enforcement action. Alternatively, Congress can authorize extrajudicial
remedies that may be privately or publicly enforced. The enforcement
by government officials of both judicial and extrajudicial remedies is a
traditional executive function.
Both kinds of executive action,
moreover, require that officials make judgments about the facts and the
application of the law to those facts.
97

Id. at 283.
This is also Justice Scalia’s understanding of a public right, which he
nonetheless links with the sovereign immunity rationale for the doctrine. See
supra notes ___ and accompanying text. As we discuss more fully below, if our
understanding of the meaning of a “public right” is correct, however, it has
nothing to do with sovereign immunity, as suggested by Justice Scalia. See infra
notes ___ and accompanying text.
99
Robert L. Glicksman, A Guide to Kansas Common Law Actions Against
Industrial Pollution Sources, 33 KAN. L. REV. 62, 643 (1985)
98
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This view of the public rights doctrine may provide an explanation
for the Court’s current view that rights arising between private parties
may be regarded as “public” rights if they are an integral part of the
enforcement of a comprehensive regulatory regime.100 The Court has
never fully explained this expanded concept of public rights, but once it
is understood that “public rights” refer to rights belonging to the public,
a coherent rationale emerges. The key point is that because the initial
determination of the dispute between private parties is incidental to the
enforcement of the regulatory regime (i.e., the vindication of public
rights), it can be described as executive in character even though it
involves the application of law to fact.101
Critically, the executive power explanation of the public rights
doctrine explains why first instance administrative decisions resembling
adjudication are constitutionally permissible, but does not justify the
foreclosure of judicial review. The Court in Murray’s Lessee may have
assumed that sovereign immunity would have barred judicial relief
absent congressional consent, but as we have seen that assumption was
unnecessary to the decision and incorrect as a matter of law. Under
Marbury, executive action subject to legal standards is subject to judicial
review for compliance with those standards. Congressional authority to
permit the first instance administrative adjudication of rights between
private parties may well be constrained by other separation of powers
concerns,102 but it does not threaten the rule of law if administrative
procedures comply with due process and judicial review is available.
A proper understanding of the public rights doctrine makes clear that
the constitutionality of precluding or limiting judicial review of
administrative decisions should be resolved without regard to whether a
public right is involved. With this jurisprudential underbrush cleared
away, it is possible to consider the foreclosure of judicial review from a
fresh perspective, unclouded by assumptions engendered by the public
rights doctrine. We turn to this task in the following section.
100

See note __ & accompanying text.
This was arguably the case in Thomas, for example, where the rights
arising between private parties were incident to the enforcement of a pesticide
registration scheme. See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
102
Likewise, the Seventh Amendment may apply to such determinations.
Our view of the public rights doctrine would permit first instance administrative
adjudication, but the Seventh Amendment might require that a jury trial be
available at some point. We will not delve into the question whether such trials
could be held by administrative adjudicators (or legislative courts).
101
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III. FORECLOSURE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The rule of law suggests two possible constraints on the foreclosure
of judicial review: due process and Article III. Ironically, while the due
process and Article III preclusion cases do not reference each other and
there has been no authoritative resolution of either issue, the Court has
ended up in roughly the same place in both areas. Under current
doctrine it appears that Congress probably cannot preclude judicial
review of colorable constitutional claims, but it can preclude judicial
review of ordinary decisions determining facts and applying statutory
standards.
A. DUE PROCESS
Beginning with American School of Magnetic Healing v.
McAnnulty,103 through the leading case of Johnson v. Robison,104 and
culminating with a number of more recent decisions, the Supreme Court
has relied on due process to require review of administrative decisions
notwithstanding statutory provisions that apparently foreclosed it. Some
of these cases employ broad rule of law reasoning that is reminiscent of
Marbury, but more recent cases focus narrowly on the foreclosure of
particular constitutional claims. This has led many commentators to
assume that due process requires a judicial forum for constitutional
claims (and the Supreme Court has suggested as much), but that due
process does not apply to foreclosure of review for ordinary
administrative decisions.
The McAnnulty case is an early example of broad rule of law
reasoning. The case arose when the Postmaster General determined that
claims by the School of Magnetic Healing that it could teach its
customers how to use the power of the mind to cure sickness were
fraudulent, and stopped delivery of the company’s mail.105 When the
company challenged this action in court, the Postmaster General argued
that judicial review of the decision was foreclosed because the statute in
question authorized such action upon evidence “satisfactory to him.”106
The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that because the Postmaster
General’s action “was a clear mistake of law as applied to admitted facts
103

187 U.S. 94 (1902).
415 U.S. 361 (1974).
105
See 187 U.S. at 95-102 (recounting the facts and proceedings in detail).
106
See Rev. Stat. § 3929 (quoted 187 U.S. at 100 n.1).
104
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. . . the courts must have power in a proper proceeding to grant relief.”107
“Otherwise,” the Court continued, “the individual is left to the
absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a public and
administrative officer, whose action is unauthorized by any law, and is in
violation of the rights of the individual. Where the action of such an
officer is thus unauthorized, he thereby violates the property rights of the
person whose letters are withheld.”108 Notwithstanding this broad
language, the Court expressly declined to reach Magnetic Healing’s
constitutional claim, but rather “construed” the statute to permit
review.109
McAnnulty takes a broad rule of law-based approach to due process
and arguably implies that judicial review of the legality of administrative
action is constitutionally required. Some subsequent cases, such as
Leedom v. Kyne,110 seem to endorse a similar approach, at least to the
extent of requiring review when administrative decisions violate a clear
statutory provision creating a right.111 These cases are limited, however,
in important respects. First, while they require review for obvious
statutory violations, they seem to assume that review may be foreclosed
for more run of the mill cases involving the application of law to the
facts. McAnnulty, for example, assumed that “the determination by the
Postmaster General of any material and relevant questions of fact arising
in the administration of the statutes of Congress relating to his
department” was conclusive.”112 Second, because they rely on statutory
107

187 U.S. at 110.
Id. See also id. at 108 (asking rhetorically “Has Congress intrusted the
administration of these statutes wholly to the discretion of the Postmaster
General, and to such an extent that his determination is conclusive upon all
questions arising under those statutes, even though the evidence which is
adduced before him is wholly uncontradicted, and shows, beyond any room for
dispute or doubt, that the case, in any view, is beyond the statutes, and not
covered or provided for by them?”).
109
Id. at 101-02.
110
358 U.S. 185 (1958).
111
See also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 680 (characterizing the contention that Congress “intended no review at all
of substantial constitutional and statutory challenges to the Secretary’s
administration of Part B of the Medicare program” as “an extreme position”)
(emphasis added); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S.
233 (1968) (construing statute precluding review of selective service
classification except as a defense to a criminal prosecution so as to permit an
injunction against a violation of the plain and unequivocal language of other
provisions of the statute).
112
187 U.S. at 107; see also Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. at 188-91
108
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interpretation to avoid constitutional problems, the cases leave the
existence of an underlying constitutional right of review unresolved.
Most of the cases refusing to permit the foreclosure of review focus
on review of particular constitutional claims. The leading example of
this sort of decision is Johnson v. Robison,113 which involved equal
protection and free exercise challenges to the denial of veteran’s benefits
to individuals who had been classified as conscientious objectors and
performed alternative civilian service. The Court considered (and
rejected) these claims notwithstanding a statute providing that there was
to be no judicial review of “any question of law or fact” arising under
any law administered by the Veteran’s Administration.114 The Court
reasoned that this provision did not foreclose review of constitutional
challenges to the statute denying benefits because such challenges arise
under the Constitution, not under any veterans benefit law.115
Although the Court in Robinson did not discuss the constitutional
difficulties that might arise from a construction that precluded judicial
review of constitutional claims, this problem was clearly lurking in the
background. In the aftermath of Robison, the Court has frequently
construed broad statutory language precluding review to permit
adjudication of constitutional claims.116 In these cases, the Court often
(distinguishing prior cases recognizing foreclosure of review on the ground that
in this case the NLRB violated a clear statutory provision granting a right);
Oesterreich, 393 U.S. at 238-399 (employing similar reasoning).
113
415 U.S. 361 (1974).
114
Former 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (quoted id. at 365 n.5) provided that “the
decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law
administered by the Veteran’s Administration providing benefits for veterans and
their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official
or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any
such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.”
115
This distinction was articulated expressly by Justice Brandeis in his
concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38,
77 (1936), which stated that “[w]hen dealing with constitutional rights (as
distinguished from privileges offered by the government) there must be the
opportunity of presenting in an appropriate proceeding at some time, to some
court, every question of law raised.” More recently, in Dalton v. Specter, 511
U.S. 462, 471-76 (1994), the Court sharply distinguished between constitutional
and statutory claims, holding that statutory challenges to military base closure
decisions were foreclosed under the applicable statute
116
See, e.g., I.N.S. v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (construing baring
review of deportation of aliens to permit review of pure questions of law because
foreclosure of such review would raised serious constitutional questions as to
whether the writ of habeas corpus had been unconstitutionally suspended);
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accepted, at least implicitly, the constitutionality of the statute as applied
in nonconstitutional cases.117
In light of these decisions, most commentators assume that it would
violate due process to deny a judicial forum for the resolution of
constitutional claims, and the Court has often suggested the same in
dicta.118 By comparison, the Court in recent years has seemed
increasingly willing to read ambiguous statutes as foreclosing review
when constitutional claims are not involved, and nothing in the
reasoning of these cases suggests that there are any constitutional
problems with reading the statutes in question to foreclose review.119
The Court, for example, articulated a reverse presumption against review
when prosecutorial inaction is at issue in Heckler v. Chaney.120
Subsequently, in Lincoln v. Vigil,121 the court held that allocation of
lump-sum appropriations is “committed to agency discretion” and thus
foreclosed from review under the Administrative Procedure Act.122
B. ARTICLE III AND THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (construing statute
precluding review of decisions on applications for immigration amnesty to
permit a due process challenge to procedures followed); Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592 (1988) (construing statute barring review of decisions by the Director
of the CIA to dismiss employees so as to permit review of constitutional claims);
see also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986)
(construing statute vesting review of Medicare reimbursement claims involving
small amounts to private fiscal intermediaries without judicial review so as to
permit constitutional and statutory challenges to agency regulations).
117
In Webster v. Doe, for example, the Court upheld portions of a lower
court’s decision holding that review of a former CIA’s procedural and statutory
challenges to his termination was foreclosed. 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988).
118
See, e.g., Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592-93; Martin H. Redish & Curtis E.
Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal
Courts: A Critical Review and Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 93 (1975)
(“There exists a due process right to an independent judicial determination of
constitutional rights . . . .”).
119
Likewise, one leading administrative law textbook observes that in the
lower courts “[t]here seems to be a modest trend in favor of finding agency
decisions committed to agency discretion.” STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B.
STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
th
AND REGULATORY POLICY 1014 (5 ed. 2002) (citing cases). The authors
continue, however, that “the trend remains modest and cautious, and judicial
review is the general rule.” Id. (citing cases).
120
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
121
508 U.S. 182 (1993).
122
Id. at 192 (1993).
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In addition to the due process issues discussed above, the preclusion
of judicial review also has Article III implications because when
Congress precludes review, it removes a category of cases “arising
under” federal law from the cognizance of the federal courts.123 The
constitutionality of such “jurisdiction stripping” statutes requires an
interpretation Article III with special reference to Exceptions Clause. In
this section, we review the debate over Congress’s power to strip the
federal courts of jurisdiction over certain cases or controversies, and
offer an alternative interpretation of the Exceptions Clause.
1. THE JURISDICTION STRIPPING DEBATE
Taken on its face, the language of the Exceptions Clause might
appear to grant Congress broad discretion to remove cases and
controversies from the jurisdiction of the federal courts:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases
before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.124
This reading, however, cannot be reconciled with the constitutional role
that Marbury assigns to the courts. As a result, the authority of
Congress to remove cases from the jurisdiction has confounded the
Court, producing no clear answer, and has given rise to one of the oldest
and most extensive debates concerning the federal courts. This debate,
which includes a famous dispute between Professors Henry Hart and
Hebert Weschler,125 and which is the subject of substantial attention in
123

Congressional restrictions on judicial review can take four different
forms. First, Congress might withdraw Supreme Court jurisdiction but retain
federal district court jurisdiction. Second, it might withdraw federal district
court jurisdiction, but permits suits in state court that are subject to Supreme
Court review.. Third, Congress could withdraw all federal jurisdiction but allow
suits in state courts. Finally, Congress could bar review in any court. See HART
& WECHSLER, supra note __, at 358-380 (distinguishing and discussing these
situations). Our focus is on the fourth possibility. It is an interesting question of
federalism whether state court review of federal administrative action would
satisfy the rule of law, but we find it unnecessary to address this hypothetical
possibility.
124
U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
125
Compare Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
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each of the major federal courts casebooks,126 has produced no less than
four different proposed resolutions.127 The standards-based approach
offers an attractive alternative to these resolutions.
No less a figure than Justice Story took the position that, under
Article III, the entire judicial power must vest somewhere in the federal
courts, a proposition that formed the premise of his argument for
appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions in Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee.128 This view draws strength from general separation of powers
doctrine and the rule of law, insofar as removal of cases from the
jurisdiction of the courts deprives them of the ability to “say what the
law is.” While this position has some supporters,129 it is difficult to
reconcile with the Exceptions Clause and has never commanded a clear
majority of the Court. Currently, a variety of statutory provisions
exclude at least some categories of Article III cases and controversies
decisions from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.130
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1362 (1953) (arguing that Congress may not limit jurisdiction so as to destroy
the essential function of the courts) with Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the
Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) (arguing that Congress has the
authority to decide the extent to which federal courts would be used).
126
See MICHAEL G. COLLINS, ROBERT N. CLINTON & RICHARD A.
MATASAR, FEDERAL COURTS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 33-73 (1996); DAVID P.
CURRIE & HARRY N. WYATT, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 98-113
(4th Ed. 1990); RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID SHAPIRO,
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 348-87
(4th ed 1996); HOWARD P. FINK, LINDA S. MULLENIX, THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. &
MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 163-91 (1995).
127
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 165-77 (2d ed. 2002) (describing four different approaches taken on
the issue of jurisdictional stripping).
128
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 330 (1816) (If, then, it is a duty of congress to
vest the judicial power of the United States, it is a duty to vest the whole judicial
power) (emphasis in original).
129
See, e.g., Akhil Amar, The Two Tiered-Structure of the Judiciary Act of
1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of
Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of
Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1596; Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional
Authority to restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498
(1974); Leonard Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); see also Lawrence Sager,
Foreward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 55 (1981) (opposing
selective withdrawal of jurisdiction).
130
See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note ___ at 36-47.
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At the other extreme is the view that Congress has plenary authority
to create exceptions to the jurisdiction of federal courts whenever it
chooses.131 The Court appeared to endorse this view in Ex parte
McCardle,132 which dismissed a constitutional challenge to incarceration
by Reconstruction era military governments on the ground that Congress
had repealed the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to consider appeals of
habeas corpus petitions.
The opinion contains broad language
suggesting that Congress has unlimited power to strip the federal courts
of jurisdiction pursuant to the Exceptions Clause.133 Nevertheless, the
Court was also careful to note that the repeal of the statute did not
completely prevent the consideration of the matter by the Court because
an alternative basis for jurisdiction – a petition for writ of certiorari –
remained available.134 The Court has subsequently backed away from
the broad language of McCardle, most notably in United States v.
Klein,135 which rejected a congressional effort to strip the courts of
jurisdiction to decide the effect of a presidential pardon.
Since the broad language of McCardle is inconsistent with
Marbury’s conception of the judicial function, the Court and most
commentators have moved to something of an uneasy middle ground.
Among the intermediate positions are the view that the “essential
functions” of the judiciary must be preserved136 and the view that
congressional authority to divest the courts of jurisdiction must be
exercised in conformity with other constitutional provisions.137 These
interpretations accept the initial proposition that the Exceptions Clause
authorizes Congress to remove cases entirely from the jurisdiction of the
131

See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court
Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV.
895 (1984).
132
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
133
See id. at 514 (“We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the
legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution; and the
power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by
express words.”).
134
See id. at 515 (“Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the
repealing act in question, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of
habeas corpus, is denied. But this is an error. The act of 1868 does not except
from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of
1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised.”). Later
that same year the Court exercised that jurisdiction in Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 8
(Wall.) 85 (1869).
135
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
136
This was Hart’s view. See supra note ___.
137
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note ___ at 39-40.
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federal courts, but attempt to identify some external constitutional limits
on that power.
2. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE EXCEPTIONS
CLAUSE
We believe, however, that there is an alternative interpretation of the
Exceptions Clause that is more consistent with the text of Article III as a
whole and more consistent with the rule of law.138 In our view, the best
reading of the Exceptions Clause is that it concerns the allocation of
cases between the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction,
and does not authorize Congress to remove cases and controversies
within the scope of federal jurisdiction from the Article III courts.139
Thus, it provides no authority for the preclusion of review.
Article III vests and defines the judicial power of the United States
in mandatory terms. Section 1 provides that the “judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested” in the Supreme Court and lower courts.140
Likewise, Section 2 provides that the “judicial Power shall extend” to
certain categories of cases and controversies.141 The natural reading of
this language is that the full extent of the judicial power must be vested
in the federal courts. This construction would parallel the provisions of
Articles I and II, both of contain vesting clauses that are generally
understood to be mandatory. Thus, reading the vesting clause of Article
III as anything other than mandatory would thus be anomalous and an
understanding of the Exceptions Clause that permits Congress to
preclude appellate review of administrative action is at odds with the
other provisions of Article III.
138

We focus on these considerations because the historical material
concerning the Exceptions Clause is “at best, incomplete.” Michael L. Wells &
Edward J. Larson, Original Intent and Article III, 70 TULANE L. REV. 75 (1995).
139
We are not the first to contend the Exceptions Clause addresses the
allocation of cases between the Supreme Court’s original and appellate
jurisdictions. See Dean Alfange, Jr, Marbury v. Madison and Original
Understandings of Judicial Review: in Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993
SUP. CT. REV. 329, 397 & n.313 (collecting authorities); see also Mark Strasser,
Taking Exception to Traditional Exceptions Clause Jurisprudence: On
Congress's Power to Limit the Court's Jurisdiction, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 125.
Contra Akhil R. Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 447 (1989); James E. Pfander,
Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (2001).
140
U.S. Const. Art III, § 1 (emphasis added).
141
U.S. Const. Art III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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The Exceptions Clause is likewise poorly drafted if its purpose was
to permit Congress to remove cases entirely from the Article III
judiciary. The Clause provides: “In all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.”142 Critically, the Clause is not a qualification
of the language in Section 1 that vests of the judicial power in the
federal courts or of the language in section 2 listing the cases and
controversies within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, which would
be the logical phrasing if its purpose was to permit removal of cases
from the courts’ authority and jurisdiction.
Instead, the exceptions language is in a clause allocating the original
and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Moreover, since the
Clause specifies that the original jurisdiction of the Surpeme Court
“shall” include certain classes of cases and that in all other cases its
jurisdiction “shall” be appellate, the language carries forward the
implication that the vesting of jurisdiction is mandatory. Finally, and
most fundamentally, the power to make exceptions is phrased not in
reference to the jurisdiction of federal courts generally, but in reference
to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.143
Both the context of the Clause and its language make it sensible to
read the Exceptions Clause as addressing the allocation of cases between
the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction. The first
sentence of the Clause sets forth the classes of cases that, at a minimum,
must be within the Court’s original jurisdiction and the Exceptions
Clause permits Congress to add to that jurisdiction by moving cases
from the Court’s appellate to its original jurisdiction.144
142

U.S. Const. Art III, § 2, cl. 2.
For this reason, Ron Levin has suggested that the historical purpose of
the Exceptions Clause was to permit Congress to exempt jury verdicts from de
novo appellate review. See Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in
Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 20 n.118 (1985) (citing The Federalist No.
81 (Hamilton) and Henry J. Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court’s Appellate
Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53 (1962).
144
Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury justified the inference of
exclusivity on the basis that this was the only reading that gave any effect to the
language in question. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174-75. But this assumption is simply
not true. The Clause makes perfect sense as a minimum requirement of original
jurisdiction cases that can be enlarged, but not diminished. We recognize the
irony of relying heavily on Marbury’s rule of law analysis but ultimately
rejecting the reading of Article III that provided the basis for the assertion of
143
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In contrast to the conventional reading of the Exceptions Clause, the
allocational interpretation provides a logically coherent account of the
Clause and its role in Article III as a whole. The classes of cases listed
in the first sentence of the Clause are especially important to the federal
system, and it makes sense to specify that they fall within the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction.145 Likewise, it is reasonable to provide for
the enlargement of the Court’s original jurisdiction to include other
cases that Congress considers sufficiently important to warrant the
exercise of that jurisdiction. At the same time, this reading of the
Exceptions Clause does not permit Congress to encroach upon the
essential functions of the judiciary by excluding cases from the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, and thus avoids any contradiction with
the mandatory language of the Vesting Clause and Article III’s definition
of the judicial power.
IV. STANDARDS-BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW
In this section of the Article we explain our standards-based
approach to the rule of law and how it applies to judicial review of
government benefit decisions. We also explain why we think it is
superior to both the current doctrine and alternative approaches that have
been suggested in the judicial review literature. Finally, we evaluate the
practical significance of a constitutional mandate that requires Article III
review of administrative adjudication.
A. STANDARDS-BASED RULE OF LAW
Our argument for standards-based judicial review is easily
summarized. Like Chief Justice Marshall,146 we believe the Constitution
establishes a rule of law state. Under the rule of law, government
officials derive their authority to act from the law and they are bound by
the law in exercising that authority. The lynchpin of this rule of law
framework is the presence of legal standards that guide and constrain
governmental authority. Thus, the rule of law ordinarily requires the
legislature to incorporate standards into statutory delegations of
power to invalidate legislation as unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, this
disagreement with Marbury is unrelated to its rule of law reasoning.
145
Indeed, this would seem consistent with the Court’s recent emphasis on
the “dignity” of states. See Federal Maritime Com'n v. South Carolina State
Ports Authority, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 1874 (2002) (“The preeminent purpose of state
sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their
status as sovereign entities.”).
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authority. When legal standards apply to official action and the rule of
law applies, essential rule of law safeguards should apply, including
judicial review. Thus, under the standards-based approach, Congress
generally cannot preclude judicial review of factual and legal decisions
concerning government benefits.
As we understand the Constitution, it promotes the rule of law in
three interrelated ways. First, Congress must establish statutory
standards to guide and limit Executive Branch lawmaking. This
requirement, which is related to both due process and separation of
powers, is enforced by the Supreme Court primarily by means of the
non-delegation doctrine. Second, when government decisions are
subject to statutory standards, the Due Process Clause obligates the
government to give adversely affected persons some type of hearing in
which they can present factual and legal arguments. Finally, adversely
affected persons are entitled to judicial review of the government’s
decision, both as a matter of due process and separation of powers.
1. THE REQUIREMENT OF STANDARDS
The model of governmental regularity embodied by the rule of law
implies a general principle of nonarbitrariness in governmental action.147
This principle in turn implies that governmental action must be
constrained by standards. Thus, the rule of law generally requires the
legislature to incorporate statutory standards to guide and control the
administration of government benefits. A standardless statute violates
the rule of law because it “‘lays down no rules by which its impartial
execution can be secured, or partiality and oppression prevented.’”148
A requirement of statutory standards is most closely associated with
separation of powers and the nondelegation doctrine. The nondelegation
is normally thought of as policing the boundary between legislative and
executive action for purposes of the Vesting Clause of the
Constitution,149 but it also serves a crucial rule of law function.
146

See supra notes __ & accompanying text.
Shapiro & Levy, supra note , at __.
148
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 372-73 (1886) (quoting City of
Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217 (1878)).
149
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1; see Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,
531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“In a delegation challenge, the constitutional question
is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the agency. Article I, §
1, of the Constitution vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted ... in a
Congress of the United States.’ This text permits no delegation of those powers .
. . .”). In other words, the formulation of an initial policy decision (i.e., setting
147
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Enforcement of the doctrine separates the creation of law from its
implementation and thereby constrains the action of government
officials by requiring that those officials act under legally binding
standards. In this sense, the requirement of standards under the
nondelegation doctrine is closely akin to a line of Supreme Court cases,
such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins,150 that suggest standardless administrative
discretion violates due process.151
We recognize that Congress often establishes vague and ambiguous
statutory standards to guide and limit Executive Action. Obviously, it
may be easier for administrators to comply with broad ambiguous
standards than with specific ones. Nonetheless, the presence even of
general standards whose application is subject to judicial review
preserves the rule of law. As explained by the Court:
Necessity therefore fixes a point beyond which it is
unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe
detailed rules; it then becomes constitutionally sufficient if
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency
which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated
authority. Private rights are protected by access to the courts to
test the application of the policy in the light of these legislative
declarations.152
The requirement of standards, however, is not absolute because the
Constitution itself contemplates that some decisions are vested in the
political discretion of the other branches. For example, the political
question doctrine demarcates a class of decisions that are not subject to
legal standards and therefore operate outside of the rule of law
constraints that generally apply to government action.153
standards) is a legislative act, while the exercise of discretion pursuant to
statutory standards is an executive act. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.
16 (1983) (distinguishing between the legislative character of the legislative veto
and the executive character Attorney General’s decision which was vetoed
because “that kind of Executive action is always subject to check by the terms of
the legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded it is open to
judicial review as well as the power of Congress to modify or revoke the
authority entirely,” while the legislative veto “is not so checked”).
150
118 U.S. 356, 372-73 (1886).
151
See Shapiro & Levy, supra note , at __ (describing and discussing the
cases).
152
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
153
See Shapiro & Levy, supra note , at __ (describing and discussing the
standardless discretion and due process).
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2. RULE OF LAW SAFEGUARDS
The nondelegation doctrine provides the foundation for a rule of law
state by requiring that legislation must generally contain statutory
standards. The Constitution creates then two essential safeguards to
insure Executive Branch compliance with such standards: due process
and judicial review. In our view, when the legislature delegates
authority pursuant to standards, the rule of law attaches. And when the
rule of law attaches so do the essential safeguards of due process and
judicial review. We dealt with the due process component of this
equation in our earlier article;154 the discussion here focuses on judicial
review.
We believe that the preclusion of judicial review is best understood
from a separation of powers perspective. Separation of powers is best
known for its political function of diffusing governmental authority,155 it
is also has an important rule of law purpose.156 As discussed previously,
the separation of the legislative and executive functions makes it
possible to ascertain and enforce legal constraints on government
action.157 Like due process, separation of powers incorporates a specific
mechanism for enforcing the rule of law: judicial review.
Article III provides for the establishment of a judiciary with
154

Shapiro & Levy, supra note ___.
See Federalist No. 47 (Hamilton) (“The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, many justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”); Massachusetts Constitution, Pt. 1,
Art. XXX (“In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of
them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or
either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”).
156
See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note __, at 67 (“[A] combination of
powers is bad because it admits ad hoc law making, not permanent and general
laws but orders cut for the occasion--all according to the will of whomever holds
combined powers. Separated powers, on the other hand work to induce
government within the rule of law.”); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Contemporary
Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORN. L. REV.
430, 450 (1987) (“A close relation between the rule of law and separation of
powers is evident in both the liberal and democratic elements of liberal
democratic theory.”).
157
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing the this aspect of
the nondelegation doctrine.
155
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jurisdiction to resolve cases and controversies, vesting the courts with
authority to oversee legislative and executive compliance with legal
standards.158 The framers not only established the judiciary as the
guardians of rule of law, they were careful to protect the independence
of the judicial branch from the other two branches, mandating that
Article III judges have life-time tenure and that Congress and the
President could not reduce the compensation of judges once they had
been appointed.159
To the extent that current doctrine permits the foreclosure of judicial
review, the application of this essential rule of law safeguard is
dependent upon legislative discretion.160 Interpreting Article III to
permit foreclosure of review puts Congress in the position of
determining if and when a litigant is entitled to the Article III protections
of an independent judiciary, which is inconsistent with a constitutional
structure that mandates separation of powers. Congress violates the
separation of powers when it precludes Article III review because this
choice makes Executive Branch the ultimate authority of determining its
own compliance with statutory standards.161
Nor can the preclusion of judicial review be justified on the ground
that Congress is dealing with government benefits as opposed to
traditional “private property.”162 A government action that violates
statutory standards is every bit as much a violation of the rule of law
when it concerns the allocation of government benefits as when it
concerns private property rights. In both cases, government agents have
failed to obey the legal standards that control their actions. We therefore
see no distinction between government benefits and private property in
respect to the application of the rule of law.
Finally, from a separation of powers perspective, judicial review by
Article III courts cannot be replaced by internal administrative appeals
or appeals to so-called Article I courts. Appellate judges in the
Executive Branch do not have the constitutionally mandated
independence needed to hold the Executive Branch in check. We are not
158

U.S. Const. Art. III, §2.
Id. at §1.
160
See supra notes __ & accompanying text.
161
In effect, the executive becomes judge in its own cause. See supra notes
__ & accompanying text.
162
As we develop in considerable detail in our due process article, the
historical significance of this distinction is vastly overstated. See Shapiro &
Levy, supra note ___ at 119-26.
159
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entirely sure what the difference is between an administrative agency
that adjudicates cases and an Article I court, except the court’s location
outside of the agency whose adjudications it reviews. Even if this
arrangement promotes the independence of Article I courts, they are still
inconsistent with the constitutional plan for separation of powers.163
Moreover, if something less than article III status were sufficient to
meet the requirements of the rule of law, it would be necessary to
determine how much independence is enough. If life tenure is not
required, what term of years is sufficient to guarantee independence?
What bases for removal “for cause” are permissible without
compromising independence? Can these judges be independent if their
salaries are not protected? These questions are not entirely academic.
As discussed below, there is evidence that some Article I courts in fact
lack the necessary separation and independence to supply critical
scrutiny of agency adjudications.164
3. SCOPE OF REVIEW
The standards-based approach to the rule of law thus suggests that
administrative determinations involving application of law to facts must
be subject to judicial review165 and that total preclusion of judicial
163

We would note that no commentator that we can find argues that Article I
review is an adequate constitutional substitute for Article III review, although
there is a difference of opinion concerning the minimum scope of Article III
review. See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. Unlike most other
commentators, we would require judicial review of both legal and factual
decision s made in government benefit decisions.
164
See infra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing Article I review of
disability determinations of the Veterans Administration).
165
This conclusion can be accommodated with sovereign immunity.
Marbury certainly implied that sovereign immunity is not a bar to review, and as
demonstrated in part II, sovereign immunity is not relevant to a proper
understanding of the public rights doctrine. Although sovereign immunity is
clearly in considerable tension with the rule of law, the doctrine has received
new life in the Supreme Court’s recent federalism decisions, see, e.g., Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate
11th Amendment immunity pursuant to the commerce power and overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999) (extending sovereign immunity to action against states in state
courts); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd. v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (same); College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (same); see
also Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (applying Alden).
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would repudiate sovereign
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review in such cases would be a violation of the rule of law. On the
other hand, the rule of law would not ordinarily require a trial de novo
by Article III courts. Deferential review would be permissible provided
sufficient scope of review is retained to permit reviewing courts to fulfill
their rule of law function. First, courts must retain the power to “say
what the law is,” at least to the point of correcting violations of the clear
statutory text or failure to apply correctly statutory standards or factors.
Second, courts must have the authority to ensure that there is a valid
factual basis for executive action. Third, courts must be able to review
the rationality of the connection between the facts found and the
statutory basis for action.166
The federal courts must retain jurisdiction to review the factual
determinations made by executive branch adjudicators, because without
such authority, the courts are not in a position to ensure compliance with
the law. Factual findings can be manipulated to evade legal constraints
and judicial review could easily be evaded if it did not include review of
factual determinations as well as legal conclusions.167 This recognition
is reflected in the text of Article III itself, which provides that the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction extends to both “Law and
immunity as to federal government. Nonetheless, sovereign immunity should not
stand as a complete bar to judicial review, because suits against government
officials for declaratory and injunctive relief are available under the doctrine of
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Court’s federalism cases emphasize
that this avenue for the vindication of federal statutory and constitutional rights
remains available. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57.
While this form of review may not make damages available, if government
benefits are wrongly withheld courts would presumably be able to require
administrative officials to comply with the law. A critical issue might be
whether a reviewing court must be able to order the disbursement of monetary
benefits, insofar as the Court has held that federal courts may not order
retroactive payment of benefits unlawfully withheld by state officials under the
Eleventh Amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). There is,
however, a critical difference between ordering a state (or the federal
government) to pay damages for a tortious act and requiring state or federal
officials to award someone a government benefit for which the person is legally
entitled and for which a state or Congress has appropriated a money to pay such
benefits.
166
See Sidney A. Shapiro and Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate
Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L. J. 387 (1987) (contending that
judicial review of an agency’s reasons is constitutionally required).
167
See Allentown Mack Sales and Service v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376
(“An agency should not be able to impede judicial review, and indeed even
political oversight, by disguising its policymaking as factfinding.”)
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Fact.”168 For this reason, the Supreme Court has at times engaged in de
novo review of “constitutional facts” that determine the outcome of
individual rights claims.169 We do not suggest that judicial review of
agency findings in ordinary cases must be de novo, but the courts must
retain sufficient review of facts and the application of law to facts to
preserve the rule of law.
In general terms, current scope of review doctrine under the
Administrative Procedure Act satisfies these requirements,170 but more
limited review may violate the rule of law. In particular, we have doubts
about the current veteran’s benefit regime, which precludes Article III
review of factual determinations except as to constitutional facts,171 and
the limitation of review in Thomas v. Union Carbide to issues of fraud,
misconduct, or misrepresentation or constitutional error.172
168

U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
In Crowell v. Benson, for example, the Court suggested that there must
be de novo review of administration decisions respecting both constitutional and
“jurisdictional” facts, construing the statute in question to permit it. See supra
note ___ and accompanying text. Although the jurisdictional fact doctrine has
fallen into disuse and de novo review of constitutional facts is not consistently
applied, these doctrines underscore the need for some factual review to prevent
abuse. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumer’s Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984)
(engaging in independent review of trial court’s finding of actual malice to
support First Amendment defense to product disparagement claim); Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (rejecting state court factual determination that
African-Americans were not excluded from the jury pool); see generally Henry
P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229 (1985).
170
5 U.S.C. § 706 permits reviewing courts to set aside agency decisions,
inter alia, if they are contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, or not supported
by substantial evidence (in formal adjudications). Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), courts may reverse an administrative construction of a
statute if the construction violates the clear statutory text or is otherwise based
on an impermissible or unreasonable construction of a statute. Under either the
substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious standard of review courts may
reverse agency decisions that are not supported by an adequate factual basis in
the record. The arbitrary and capricious standard of review also requires that the
agency articulate the connection between the facts found and the choice made,
and this form of review focuses on the adequacy of the agency’s explanation.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
171
In particular, under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (200_), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over
veterans benefit appeals, “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual
determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of
a particular case,” except for constitutional claims.
172
See supra notes ___ (discussing limitation of review of arbitral awards
169
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Whether statutes limiting review by restricting the timing of review
or limiting the parties who may seek review present a problem would
depend on the circumstances. Except perhaps where delay would lead to
the permanent loss of an irreplaceable interest, the preclusion statutes
that affect only the timing of judicial review would not present a serious
problem. On the other hand, partial preclusion statutes that prevent
particular parties from seeking review,173 are problematic if they leave
those injured by the improper application of legal standards without a
remedy.
4. FORECLOSURE OF REVIEW AND POLITICAL DISCRETION
Judicial review would be required for most government benefit
decisions under the foregoing analysis. The only exception would be
when the Constitution itself contemplates standardless political
discretion. In such cases, the rule of law does not attach and neither
does the requirement of judicial review. Indeed, this aspect of the
standardfs-based approach helps to make sense of prominent cases in
which the Court has upheld foreclosure of review.
In Heckler v. Chaney,174 for example, the Court held that
prosecutorial decisions by administrative officials are presumptively
nonreviewable. The Court’s analysis of this issue focused on separation
of powers concerns and emphasized that like prosecutorial discretion in
criminal matters, administrative prosecution is a function that “has long
been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch ….”175
Indeed, while prosecutorial discretion cannot be exercised in violation of
constitutional rights (e.g., in a racially discriminatory manner), it is
generally subject to standardless discretion.
Other preclusion decisions can be explained in similar terms.
National security considerations within the President’s foreign relations
powers were implicated in Webster v. Doe,176 which held that decisions
of the Directer of the CIA to terminate an employer were not reviewable
(except for constitutional claims).177 Likewise, Lincoln v. Vigil, which
under FIFRA to claims of fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation, or
constitutional error).
173
See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340 (1984),
174
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
175
Id. at 832.
176
486 U.S. 592 (1988).
177
Id. at 600-05.
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refused to review a decision by the Indian Health Service not to fund a
medical facility, can be explained in terms of traditional executive
prerogatives relating to the allocation of discretionary budget items.178
We do not anticipate that this exception would justify Congress in
giving the Executive Branch standardless discretion over most
government benefits.179 Decisions about welfare benefits, licenses, and
most government jobs do not require that government officials have
unfettered discretion in order to make the government run more
effectively. The exception would come into play, however, concerning
some forms of government employment, because of the President’s
unique role for the oversight of executive officials, including the
appointment and removal of those officials.180 For similar reasons, it
might also apply to some government contracts and grants.
B. OTHER VIEWS
As noted earlier, although there is an extensive literature on the
extent to which Congress can foreclose judicial review, we are the first
to offer a standards-based theory that requires Article III review of the
initial administrative adjudication of facts and law in government benefit
claims. While some other commentators argue that at least some form of
judicial review is constitutionally compelled, we argue in this part that
our standards-based approach is preferable to approach taken by these
other commentators.
1. PUBLIC RIGHTS
The administrative adjudication literature is for the most part highly
critical of the public rights doctrine, challenging its historical
foundations, its conceptual incoherence, and its fundamental
inconsistency with the rule of law.181 Nevertheless, most of the
178

508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) (“The allocation of funds from a lump-sum
appropriation is another administrative decision traditionally regarded as
committed to agency discretion.”).
179
See Shapiro & Levy, supra note , at 138-39 (discussing this exception to
standards requirement).
180
See id. at 140-41 (discussing the political discretion exception as applied
to public employment).
181
See, e.g., AMAN & MAYTON, supra note __, at 126 (“Because the public
and private rights distinction . . . allows the courts’ important federal question
jurisdiction to be allocated to agencies without reference to Article III or its
purposes, the distinction is surely deficient.”); Fallon, supra note ___, at 953
(“to the extent that [the public rights doctrine] displaces checks against arbitrary
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commentary assumes that the doctrine exempts administrative
adjudication of public rights entirely from Article III,182 and that the
doctrine would have to be abolished in order to ensure some form of
judicial review.183 Commentators who favor abolishing the public rights
doctrine would replace it with the balancing test announced by the Court
in Schor or some variation of it. Professor Richard Fallon is the leading
proponent of this approach. His “appellate review theory” of judicial
review posits that “when Congress chooses to employ a non-article III
federal adjudicator, it must provide for judicial review of at least some
issues in a constitutional court.”184
and self-interested government action, the doctrine threatens the rule of law”).
For additional commentary critical of the public rights doctrine, see Paul M.
Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts
under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 250 (1990) (“For even if the ‘public rights’
category were an intelligible and manageable category (which it is plainly not),
we still have not been told why the category is congruent with cases where the
use of an article I court or administrative agency is valid.”); Martin H. Redish,
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline
Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, at 210 (discussing the constitutional flaws in the
public-rights doctrine) Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts,
56 U. COLO.L.REV. 581, 592-602 (1985) (arguing that the Article III safeguards
are especially necessary in public rights cases); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights
and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to
Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 837 (1986) (criticizing the public-rights doctrine
from a separation-of-powers perspective); see also Kenneth S. Klein, The
Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine in Light of the Historical Rationale of the
Seventh Amendment, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013 (1994) (arguing against
the constitutional validity of the public-rights doctrine with respect to the
Seventh Amendment); Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the Public Rights
Doctrine in Light of the Historical Rationale of the Seventh Amendment 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013 (1994) (arguing that the history of the Seventh
Amendment does not support the application of the public rights doctrine).
182
See, e.g. GLEN O. ROBINSON, ERNEST GELLHORN & HAROLD H. BRUFF,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 163 (4th ed. 1993) (The Supreme Court has
“approved foreclosure of review of nonconstitutional claims, and the prevailing
assumption since Crowell has been that judicial review of public right claims is
not required.) (citation omitted).
183
Professor Stern is a notable exception. He reviews Murray’s Lessee and
notes, as we do, that the facts and reasoning of the case do not address the
foreclosure of review, but he does not fully explain the public rights doctrine.
See Craig A. Stern What's a Constitution among Friends?–Unbalancing Article
III, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1062-63 (1998); see also Joshua I. Schwartz
Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1815, 1883-85 (1989) (arguing that Murray’s Lessee and Crowell do not
support foreclosure of judicial review of public rights cases).
184
Fallon, supra note ___, at 949. See also Richard B. Saphire & Michael
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Our understanding of the public rights doctrine causes us to take a
different route. As we discussed previously,185 the public rights doctrine
is best understood as standing for the proposition that extrajudicial
action to enforce rights belonging to the public is executive action.
From this perspective, the doctrine permits executive action resembling
adjudication in the first instance, but says nothing about the foreclosure
of judicial review. Thus, we do not see the public rights doctrine as
incompatible with a general constitutional requirement of judicial review
of executive action. The doctrine may therefore continue to play an
important role in assessing the constitutionality of first instance
adjudication by agencies (or legislative courts).186
We also reject use of a balancing test to determine when Article III
review must be employed. Whether the foreclosure of review is
consistent with the rule of law, under either a due process or Article III
approach, can and should be resolved by reference to Marbury’s
understanding of the judicial role in enforcing the rule of law. Under
this approach, Article III review is required for all agency adjudications
in order to preserve the rule of law except where the Constitution
contemplates that Congress can authorize Executive Action without
establishing standards for such action.
2. DUE PROCESS
E. Solimine Shoring up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC
v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85 (1988) (arguing that judicial review should be
required under the Schor test).
185
See supra notes __ & accompanying text.
186
In light of the Court’s longstanding recognition of the doctrine and its
role in preserving the constitutionality of first instance administrative
adjudication (without juries), we doubt that the Court is prepared to directly
repudiate it. In a similar vein, Professor Fallon concludes that the doctrine is too
well-ensconced to be rejected, but seeks to narrow its scope to render it
consistent with his appellate review theory of Article III. See Fallon, supra note
___, at 953-70. Although the rule of law does not speak to first instance
administrative adjudication, provided that sufficient judicial review is retained,
other Article III considerations, such as preserving the structural balance of the
three branches, as well as the Seventh Amendment, are implicated by
administrative adjudication in the first instance. Whether the public rights
doctrine is an appropriate component of the analysis of these issues is beyond the
scope of this article. For analysis of the Seventh Amendment issues, see
Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine in Light of the
Historical Rationale of the Seventh Amendment 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013
(1994); Ellen Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh
Amendment, 77 N.C.L. REV. 1037 (1999).
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Many scholars approach foreclosure of judicial review from a due
process perspective,187 drawing on the Supreme Court’s cases suggesting
that preclusion of review may violate due process.188 While preclusion
of review may violate due process, the due process approach is ill suited
to provide a coherent account of judicial review, which is primarily a
separation of powers safeguard and is best understood from that
perspective.189
Under current doctrine, due process only attaches to government
decisions that deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest.
When government benefit decisions are involved, this doctrine permits
Congress to evade due process safeguards by declining to create an
entitlement. Thus, linking judicial review to due process would not,
under current doctrine, prevent Congress from foreclosing review (by
declining to create an entitlement).190
Even when there is a protected interest, the availability of judicial
review under current doctrine would appear to be a question of what
process is due and therefore subject to Matthews v. Eldridge’s
instrumental calculus.191 Thus, judicial review would be available only
if it could be shown that the benefits of judicial review in terms of
increased accuracy exceed its costs. This approach accords no value to
the systemic interest in preserving the rule of law.

187

See Weinberg, supra note ___ (arguing that due process, not Article III,
should be the primary referent for considering congressional authority to limit
the jurisdiction of federal courts); see also Richard Fallon, Some Confusions
About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 309, 332-35 (1993) (analyzing due process right of review).
188
See supra notes __ & accompanying text.
189
To the extent that due process reflects the rule of law generally, judicial
review and due process are linked. But we think the constitutional safeguards
for the rule of law are best understood within the context of the particular
provisions from which they derive. Thus, procedural safeguards are best
analyzed from a due process perspective and judicial review is best analyzed in
terms of Article III and the separation of powers.
190
This and other problems with the current approach to due process were
the focus of our earlier article, which advances the standards-based approach to
the rule of law as a solution. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note ___.
191
For an application of Matthews to the question of judicial review, see
Note, Congressional Preclusion of Judicial Review of Federal Benefit
Disbursement: Reasserting Separation of Powers, 97 HARV. L. REV. 778 (1984)
(arguing that Matthews prevents complete preclusion of review).
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In the final analysis, absent a comprehensive reformulation of due
process doctrine, the Due Process Clause does not provide a secure
foundation for judicial review.192 None of the commentators supporting
the due process approach to judicial review have offered such a
reformulation of the doctrine. More fundamentally, treating judicial
review as a component of due process diminishes its constitutional role.
Judicial review is more than a particular procedural safeguard; it is a
core rule of law requirement.
3. ARTICLE III
In the “huge” body of scholarly comment on the power of Congress
to restrict federal jurisdiction in light of Article III,193 the only consensus
is that the issues are unlikely to be resolved definitively in the
foreseeable future. Much of the traditional debate has focused on the
meaning of Article III’s jurisdictional provisions. While some scholars
join us in reading the mandatory language of these provisions as
requiring that the entire judicial power must vest in Article III courts,194
the majority of commentators reject this view. Nevertheless, most of
majority recognizes some constraints on congressional authority to limit
the jurisdiction of federal courts.195
One influential view posits that Congress may not use its
jurisdictional authority to interfere with the “essential functions” of the
judiciary. This approach “essential” asks whether a particular preclusion
of review “will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the
constitutional plan”196 or undermine the distribution of authority
192

Of course, our standards-based approach to due process might be one
such comprehensive reformulation and it would eliminate the problem of
whether due process attaches. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note ___. But our
approach does not challenge the Mathews v. Eldridge, which – with some
tweaking – we consider to be an acceptable mode of inquiry for determining
whether particular procedural safeguards are required. Id. at 141-42.
193
See Howard P. Fink, Linda S. Mullenix, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Mark V.
Tushnet, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 181 (1996) (referring to the
“huge” literature and describing it). As noted earlier, this is one of the oldest
and most famous debates regarding the federal courts. See supra notes ___ and
accompanying text
194
See supra notes __ & accompanying text.
195
Some commentators, however, do argue that Congress has plenary
authority to restrict federal jurisdiction. See Gerald Gunther, Congressional
Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the
Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984).
196
Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953);
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between the judiciary and the other branches of government.197 Because
this approach focuses on broader structural issues, it tends to submerge
rule of law concerns and does not fully account for the individual
interest in governmental regularity.
Many scholars, for example, assume that the essential functions
approach does not require judicial review of statutory, as opposed to
constitutional, claims. It remains unclear, however, why there is any less
need for judicial review when statutory rights are involved. The
concerns about rule of law are the same in both cases. 198 To the extent
some commentators use essential functions analysis to argue for a broad
requirement of judicial review in every case,199 we think the standardsbased rule of law approach provides a superior conceptual framework
because it explains why judicial review is an “essential” function.
Even among scholars who would require review of statutory
interpretation and other legal issues, there is a split of opinion
concerning whether some judicial review of fact-finding is also
necessary.200 This difference of opinion tends to derive from the
structural separation of powers perspective of those who advocate
mandatory review. Limiting judicial review of fact-finding in a narrow
group of statutory cases would not necessarily unbalance the three
branches of government by interfering with the essential functions of the
Ratner, supra note ___ (arguing that the essential functions approach precludes
Congress from negating the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over any
given subject on the ground that it would prevent the Court from its essential
function of maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal law).
197
Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, __ (1984).
198
See Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of “Congress” to
Attack the “Jurisdiction” of “Federal Courts”, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1424
(2000) (“[T]here is no good reason why a claimant with a merely statutory claim
against a federal official should have less access to an apolitical forum than a
claimant with a constitutional claim.”)
199
The leading exponent of this “appellate review theory” is Richard Fallon.
See Fallon, supra note ___ and accompanying text.
200
Compare Saphire & Solimine, supra note __, at 139 (requiring judicial
review of both factual and legal determinations) with Fallon, supra note __, at
987 (requiring judicial review only of legal issues and establishing a
presumption against judicial review of factual issues) and Paul M. Bator, The
Constitution As Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under
Article III, 65 IND. L. REV. 233, 267-28 (1990) (requiring judicial review of
legal issues, but not of factual issues as long as agency procedures comport with
due process).
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judiciary or unduly trammeling on the constitutional authority of the
federal courts.
We disagree that Congress can preclude judicial review of factfinding by the Executive Branch. Our disagreement arises from two
points made earlier. First, unconstrained discretion over the factual
determinations that provide the predicate for lawful government action
can defeat the rule of law.201 Second, appellate review in the Executive
Branch is insufficient to protect the rule of law.202 We therefore
conclude the rule of law requires at least some judicial review of
administrative factual determinations and of the application of law to
facts. This conclusion is supported by our reading of the text of Article
III, which specifically refers to the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction as extending to “Law and Fact.”203
C.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The debate about judicial preclusion is longstanding and extensive
with federal courts scholars, in particular, taking a range of positions.
This debate, however, has mostly ignored the rule of law considerations
that we regard as of the utmost constitutional significance. We believe
the rule of law is significant not only as a matter of constitutional
principle, but for practical reasons as well. Along with procedural due
process, judicial review is an essential safeguard against errors and
abuse by government officials.
While some observers are skeptical of the value of judicial review
and assume that the costs of judicial intervention in administrative
decisions outweigh its benefits,204 our understanding is different.
Judicial review of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in the 1980s
demonstrates the important role that judicial review plays in preserving
the rule of law.
More recent experience with the Veterans
Administration (VA) suggests the independence of Article III judges is a
crucial element of that role.
After the election of President Ronald Reagan, SSA adopted a series
of highly restrictive policies and practices that resulted in sharply
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increased rates of denial or termination of benefits.205 While some of
these policies and practices and resulting denials and terminations were
legitimate responses to concerns about abuse of the system, the SSA
itself admitted that it wrongfully terminated benefits to hundreds of
thousands claimants.206 Moreover, the courts found that many of the
SSA’s policies and practices were contrary to applicable statutory
standards and in some instances flagrantly so.207 Although the SSA
often resisted these judicial decisions through a formal policy of
“nonacquiescence”208 and used unpublished policies and bureaucratic
practices to influence nominally independent administrative
decisionmakers,209 it was eventually forced to abandon or modify most
of its restrictive practices.210
Most observers agree that judicial review was an essential safeguard
for the rule of law in the administration of Social Security benefits.211
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Certainly, administrative appeals within SSA did not provide sufficient
protection and indeed were part of the problem. It is possible that an
Article I court would have had greater independence and therefore
provided adequate protection for beneficiaries, but experience with the
VA suggests that Article I courts are not always sufficiently independent
of the agencies they review.
Prior to 1989, Congress precluded any Article III review of VA
disability decisions. In 1989, Congress responded to longstanding and
nearly unanimous complaints by veterans associations about the lack of
fair and responsive adjudication by the VA by adopting the Veterans
Judicial Review Act.212 The Act established what is now known as the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC), an Article I court, to
review the factual and legal conclusions of the VA.213 The CAVC’s
decisions are subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, which has Article III status, but this review does not
include factual determinations or the application of statutes or
regulations to the facts of a particular case.214
The VA disability adjudication system, however, continues to be
highly dysfunctional.215 The VA has over 600,000 pending claims,216
and the agency takes an average of two and one-half to three years to
but we respectfully submit that it is also wrong.
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process a claim.217 Moreover, over the last seven years, CAVC has
remanded nearly 70 percent of the appeals it has heard,218 and the VA
takes nearly five times as long to process a remand as an original
claim.219
Professor James O’Reilly argues the CAVC’s Article I status has
contributed to the VA’s failure to reform itself because the court lacks
sufficient independence from the VA.220 According to Professor
O’Reilly, “[T]he reading of dozens of CAVC decisions convinces the
reader that the CAVC does not exhibit the will to compel the VA to
deliver timely and accurate service to those who present claims before
the CAVC. The CAVC itself seems captive of a dysfunctional
system.”221 He compares the more favorable record of Article III review
of social security cases, discussed previously, and recommends that
Congress abolish the CAVC and adopt the Social Security appeals
model for VA.222
We do not wish to overstate the differences between Social Security
and Veterans benefits. Judicial review has not prevented controversies
surrounding the Social Security benefit decisions and many claimant
advocates remain dissatisfied with the system. Moreover, problems at
the VA are attributable to a variety of factors, including inadequate
funding and personnel and inherent difficulties in processing claims.223
Nevertheless, we concur with Professor O’Reilly that the CAVC’s
Article I status has contributed to the failure of reform.
It is extraordinary that the CAVC has remanded 70 percent of the
disability appeals it has heard. This record may simply reflect the VA’s
inability to get it right the first time. An examination of these appeals,
217
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however, also indicates that the CAVC has exhibited excessive tolerance
for VA delay and ineptitude by failing to interpret its powers and the
VA’s mandate in ways that could speed decisionmaking and improve its
accuracy.224 The CAVC’s failure to act forcefully may be the product of
any number of causes. When we compare the court’s failure to act with
the strong and persistent effort of Article III judges to hold SSA
accountable in the 1980s, however, we are left with the firm impression
that the court’s Article I status is a key factor.
The experience with the VA suggests to us the independence of
Article III judges can be an important element in establishing meaningful
and effective judicial review. The experience with the VA also suggests
to us the practical consequences of denying meaningful and independent
review. In light of the delays at the VA, it is not at all unusual for a
veteran to die before his or her meritorious disability claim is
resolved.225
CONCLUSION
The rule of law is central our constitutional order. Its protections
should apply broadly to government action, including the allocation of
government benefits. Under current doctrine, however, that is not
always the case, particularly when it comes to government benefits.
Instead, the application of essential rule of law safeguards, including
judicial review, is a matter of legislative grace.
In this article, we have attempted to clear away the doctrinal morass
that complicates this important area of the law. We have demonstrated
that the public rights doctrine should have no bearing on the necessity of
judicial review. We have shown that the due process and Article III
224

See Levy, supra note ___, at 321-22 (discussing failure of the CAVC to
scrutinize VA benefit decisions carefully notwithstanding recent legislation
designed to encourage a more aggressive posture); James T. O’Reilly, Burying
Ceaser: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process Is Needed to Provide
Fairness to Claimants, 53 Ad. L. Rev. 223 (2001) (explaining ways the CAVC
could have, but has not, improved VA decisionmaking); Bill Russo, Ten Years
After the Battle for Veterens Judicial Review: An Assessment, Fed. Law., June,
1999, at 29 (same); [check this]); Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory
Practice, American Bar Association, Report and Recommendation (date?)
(same).
225
Many claims are made by elderly World War II or Korean veterans in the
last few years prior to their deaths. Robin J. Arzt, What Veterans Would Gain
From Administrative Procedure Act Adjudications, TOMMY: A LAWYERS GUIDE
TO VETERANS AFFAIRS, Issue 2, 2002, at 1.

STANDARDS-BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW
57
jurisprudence on the foreclosure of judicial review fails to resolve the
critical issue of whether Congress can foreclose nonconstitutional
review of agency action, and it offers no coherent explanation of how
the foreclosure of judicial review can be reconciled with the rule of law.
And we have presented our alternative – a standards-based approach to
judicial review.
The standards-based approach offers a coherent account not only of
judicial review, but also of due process (as we have argued in a
companion article to this one). It is therefore a much more promising
approach to the rule of law than either current doctrine or the
alternatives that have been suggested in the literature.
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